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CHAPTER 11 
Evidence 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 11.1. Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification.* Evidence is 
generally considered a proper subject for expert testimony if the evidence 
is beyond the knowledge and experience of the average layman 1 and will 
assist the jury in determining a fact in issue. 2 In recent years, courts in 
several jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether expert tes-
timony is admissible when offered to demonstrate the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification. Both state3 and federal 4 courts have consis-
tently upheld the trial judges' decisions to exclude this type of testimony. 
Courts which have held against admissibility of such testimony have 
generally expressed concern that the testimony will cause unnecessary 
delay and increased cost, 5 invade the province of the jury, 6 and distract 
the jury from its factfinding duties with extraneous information having an 
aura of scientific reliability. 7 Massachusetts courts have followed this 
approach and excluded expert testimony impeaching eyewitness iden-
t Steven N. Berk, Edward F. Mahoney, Jennifer A. Parks, Cynthia R. Porter, Ettore 
Santucci. 
* By Jennifer A. Parks, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 11.1. 1 McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972); FED. 
R. Evm. 704. 
2 FED. R. Evm. 704; see United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). 
3 See, e.g., People v. Plasencia, 140 Cal. App. 3d 853, 858-59, 189 Cal. Rptr. 804,809, 
(1983); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827,831-32 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); 
State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 944-45 (La. 1982); State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194, 197 (Me. 
1979); contra State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 290-92, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223-24 (1983). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
1008 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 100 (1977); United 
States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1975). 
5 United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (lOth Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Amaral, 448 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). 
6 Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 1059,594 S.W.2d 24, 28-29 (1980); People v Johnson, 
38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836-37 (1974); Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 
S.W.2d 513, 521-22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972). 
7 United States v. Amaral, 448 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Kater, 
388 Mass. 519, 525,447 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (1983); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 
444, 381 N.E.2d 582, 593 (1978). 
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tification when the judge determined that the subject matter was not 
beyond the common knowledge and experience of the trier of fact. 8 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court twice considered 
the issue of admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness unreliability. 
Both Commonwealth v. Francis 9 and Commonwealth v. Sowers 10 in-
volved the admissibility of expert testimony relating to the reliability of a 
key witness's identification of a criminal defendant. In Francis, the Court 
upheld the trial judge's exclusion of testimony by a psychologist and a 
psychiatrist, 11 who were to testify on the effects of post-event information 
on a witness's identification of the defendant. 12 In Sowers, the Court 
upheld the admission of testimony of an opthalmologist concerning the 
legally blind witness's ability to identify the defendant. 13 
The defendant in Francis was charged with armed robbery of a super-
market and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in connection 
with the alleged robbery .14 Betty Southworth, a principal witness for the 
prosecution, was a courtesy booth clerk at the supermarket. 15 Southworth 
testified at a probable cause hearing, before the grand jury, and at trial 
that the person who robbed the store wore a short-sleeved shirt and had 
no distinctive features. 16 The defendant, however, had tattoos on his arms 
both at the time of the robbery and at the 1980 trial. 17 The defendant 
displayed his arms to the jury as part of his defense. 18 The jury was unable 
to reach a verdict and a new trial was scheduled. 19 
Southworth had been a sequestered witness at the first trial, 20 but prior 
to the second trial she overheard a conversation between a police officer 
and the assistant district attorney and learned that the defendant had 
tattoos on his arms. 21 Shortly thereafter, Southworth advised an assistant 
district attorney that she had remembered that the person who robbed the 
store wore a long-sleeved jacket. 22 In February, 1981, in compliance with 
8 Supreme Malt Prods. Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 334 Mass. 59, 
63-64, 133 N.E.2d 775,779 (1946); Meehan v. Holyoke St. Ry., 186 Mass. 511,514,72 N.E. 
61, 62-63 (1904); Perkins v. Augusta Ins. & Banking Co., 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 312, 324 (1858); 
Commonwealth v. Middleton, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 902 (1978) (rescript). 
9 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983). 
10 388 Mass. 207, 446 N.E.2d 51 (1983). 
11 390 Mass. at 102, 453 N .E.2d at 1210-11. 
12 ld. at 93-94, 453 N.E.2d at 1206. 
13 388 Mass. at 218, 446 N.E.2d at 57-58. 
14 390 Mass. at 89, 453 N.E.2d at 1204. 
15 ld. at 90, 453 N.E.2d at 1204. 
16 ld. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. 
2
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a motion for disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the assistant district 
attorney informed defense counsel of Southworth's change in memory. 23 
A subsequent motion by the defendant for extra fees and costs for 
expert assistance to assess the eyewitness testimony was denied by the 
superior court judge, 24 who reasoned that the expert's testimony would be 
inadmissible because it would be information within the scope of the 
average juror's knowledge. 25 The denial of the motion was vacated by an 
appeals court justice, who regarded the defendant's request as directed 
specifically to explaining post-event information's effect on Southworth's 
memory, not to explaining generally the reliability of eyewitness tes-
timony.26 
At the October 1981 trial, Southworth testified that the defendant was 
the robber, and had taken a gun from underneath a jacket he was wear-
ing. 27 On cross-examination, Southworth admitted that before the grand 
jury and at the 1980 trial she had testified that the man wore a short-
sleeved jersey and no jacket, and pulled a revolver out from under his 
shirt. 28 She also admitted having overheard that the defendant had tattoos 
on his arms. 29 
The defendant presented alibi witnesses and exhibited his arms to the 
jury. 30 The judge then conducted an examination out of the presence of 
the jury to determine whether to admit the testimony of two expert 
witnesses proposed by the defense to the effect that a person at a high 
level of stress usually has a reduced ability to remember what he ob-
serves, 31 and that a person can incorporate post-event information in his 
memory, thereby changing prior memory. 32 
The judge refused to admit the expert testimony. 33 He reasoned that the 
proposed testimony was not beyond the common knowledge and experi-
23 Id. at 90-91, 453 N.E.2d at 1205. 
24 Id. at 91, 453 N.E.2d at 1205. 
25 ld. 
26 I d. Conrad Berube, assistant manager of the market, also testified at trial. He identified 
the defendant as the robber but said he was too nervous during the robbery to remember 
what the robber was wearing or any distinctive features of the robber. Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 93, 453 N.E.2d at 1206. The proposed witnesses were Elizabeth Loftus, Ph.D., an 
experimental psychologist specializing in human memory and perception, and Margaret 
Hagen, an associate professor of psychiatry at Boston University. ld. Dr. Loftus testified on 
voir dire that witnesses are influenced "rather unconsciously" by post-event information, 
and are not lying when their memory is altered. ld. She further testified that there is little 
relationship between the certainty and the accuracy of the witness's identification. Id. 
30 ld. 
31 I d. at 94, 453 N .E.2d at 1206. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. 
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ence of the average juror, and that it would not aid the jury in its 
duties. 34 Additionally, he stated that the proposed testimony was not 
based on scientific evidence. 35 Subsequently, verdicts of guilty were re-
turned against the defendants on all counts. 36 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct appellate 
review. 37 The sole issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge erred in 
excluding the expert testimony. 38 The Court found no error, noting that 
trial judges have discretion in the admission or exclusion of expert tes-
timony. 39 In reaching this result, the Court first recognized that courts in 
other states have "almost uniformly" upheld the trial judge's exclusion of 
testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. 40 The Court stated 
that most opinions note that when matter is within the knowledge of the 
jury, cross-examination and jury instructions can protect the defendant's 
rights. 41 The Court also recognized that some courts have been concerned 
about the effect that the aura of reliability of expert testimony may have 
on the jury. 42 
The Court then noted that Massachusetts has followed the majority 
view that if the testimony offered by a proposed expert is not within the 
common knowledge or experience of the jury, such testimony is admissi-
ble, subject to the discretion of the trial judge. 43 The Court observed that 
in recent years, while following the same basic principles, their inquiry 
has focused on whether, subject to the wide discretion of the trial judge, 
an expert's testimony would be of assistance to the jury. 44 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 94-95, 453 N.E.2d at 1207. 
36 Id. at 89, 453 N.E.2d at 1204. 
37 ld. 
38 Id. at 101, 453 N.E.2d at 1210-1211. 
39 I d. at 95, 453 N.E.2d at 1207 (citing People v. Plasencia, 140 Cal. App. 3d 853, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 804 (1983); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 
(1977); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 762 (1974); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 
153, 657 P.2d 17 (1983); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981)). 
4o Id. 
41 ld. In addition, the Court cited several federal court cases which dealt with the issue 
and found that the basic reasoning in those cases was the same as in the state cases, 
regardless of whether the matters arose before or after the effective date of Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. I d. (citing United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-84 (1st Cir. 
1979); United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368-369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. 
Davis v. United States, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979)). 
42 Id. at 98, 453 N.E.2d at 1209 (citing Commonwealth v. Boyle, 346 Mass. 1, 189 N.E.2d 
844 (1963); Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956); New 
England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 319, 321-22 (1851)). 
43 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543,420 N.E.2d 905 (1981); Bernierv. 
Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372,403 N.E.2d 391 (1980); Commonwealth v. Fournier, 372 
Mass. 346, 361 N.E.2d 1294 (1977)). 
44 Id. at 99, 453 N.E.2d at 1209. 
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The Court noted that the line between common knowledge and expert 
knowledge varies over time and is often difficult to draw, and that the 
circumstances of each case will determine whether the testimony ought to 
be admitted. 45 Additionally, the Court recognized that when the question 
of whether or not testimony will aid the jury is a close one, the likelihood 
of prejudice resulting from an erroneous admission or exclusion is slight. 46 
Consequently, the Court noted, appellate courts have given great defer-
ence to the rulings of trial judges concerning the admissibility of expert 
testimony. 47 
The Court further reasoned that other protections are available to 
reduce the likelihood of erroneous eyewitness identifications. 48 The Court 
pointed out that in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez 49 it had held that if a 
defendant fairly raises the issue of misidentification, appropriate instruc-
tions should be given to the jury. 50 The Court also noted that traditionally, 
cross-examination and closing arguments are relied on to develop enough 
weaknesses in the eyewitness testimony to establish reasonable doubt. 51 
The Court asserted, moreover, that expert testimony concerning 
eyewitness identification has not been a standard safeguard against mis-
identification. 52 Such testimony, the Court stated, in addition to increas-
ing costs and introducing collateral issues, raises more fundamental prob-
lems of intruding into an area that has traditionally been exclusively ajury 
function. 53 The jury, the Court stated, must decide what testimony to 
believe. 54 The judge may, and sometimes must, 55 instruct the jury as to 
factors which may make eyewitness testimony unreliable. 56 The Court 
noted, however, that the judge may not tell the jury what weight to give 
those factors, 57 and it is in that area that expert testimony might aid the 
jury. 58 
In this case, however, the Court reasoned that the testimony sought to 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 100, 453 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968) (convictions set aside if photographic identification procedure is impermissibly sug-
gestive); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1%7) (presence of counsel at a show-up); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1%7) (presence of counsel at a line-up)). 
•• Id. 
49 378 Mass. 2%, 302, 391 N.E.2d 889, 893 (1979). 
50 Francis, 390 Mass. at 100, 453 N.E.2d at 1210. 
51 ld. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 100-01, 453 N.E.2d at 1210. 
55 See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 302, 391 N.E.2d 889, 893 (1979). 
56 390 Mass. at 101, 453 N.E.2d at 1210. 
57 Id. 
58 ld. 
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be introduced dealt only with general principles which the jury was 
already able to understand. 59 Specifically, the Court noted that juries are 
aware of the fact that memories fade over time, that people under a great 
amount of stress are not as perceptive as alert persons not under stress, 
and that people tend to unconsciously resolve inconsistencies between 
their memories and after-acquired facts. 60 The Court concluded that on 
the basis of these principles, as well as facts presented at trial, the jury 
could weigh the witness's credibility without the aid of an expert. 61 
In summary, the Court in Commonwealth v. Francis found no reason to 
depart from the general rule allowing the trial judge discretion in exclud-
ing expert testimony concerning the accuracy of eyewitness identifica-
tion. 62 The Court concluded that the testimony would not have assisted 
the jury, and expressed concern that it in fact may have prolonged the trial 
and distracted the jury. 63 
Commonwealth v. Sowers, 64 like Francis, involved expert testimony 
which related to the reliability of an identification. In Sowers, however, 
the Court upheld a trial judge's admission of expert testimony by an 
ophthalmologist concerning a witness's ability to identify the defendant. 65 
The victim in Sowers was a legally blind woman who was also an albino. 66 
She alleged that the defendant attacked her on a Brighton street around 
midnight on July 15, 1979. 67 According to the victim's testimony, the 
defendant dragged her into an alley, beat her, held a knife to her throat, 
and finally forced her into a room in a burned out building beside the 
alley. 68 There he raped her, went through her pocketbook, and took her 
watch from her wrist. 69 The room in which this took place was illuminated 
by a street light shining through the windows. 70 The victim studied her 
attacker's face during the half-hour she was with him, so as to be able to 
identify him. 71 
The victim gave the police a description of her assailant while she was 
still at the scene of the attack. 72 The next morning she selected a picture of 
59 ld. 
60 Id. 
61 ld. 
62 Id. at 102, 453 N.E.2d at 1211. 
63 Id. at 101, 453 N.E.2d at 1210. 
64 388 Mass. 207, 208, 446 N.E.2d 51, 52 (1983). 
6> Id. 
66 Id. at 208-09, 446 N.E.2d at 52. 
67 Id. at 209, 446 N.E.2d at 52. 
68 Id. at 209, 446 N.E.2d at 53. 
69 ld. 
70 ld. 
71 Id. 
72 I d. The defendant presented alibi witnesses at the trial. They testified that the defendant 
did not own clothes such as those described by the victim. Id. 
6
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the defendant out of a book of photographs at the police station. 73 She 
later identified the defendant at a show-up, 74 and again at trial. 75 
At trial, a qualified expert in opthalmology, with a specialty in the field 
of albinism, 76 testified that he had seen the victim as a patient on three 
occasions, and that she was an albino and legally blind. 77 He explained the 
victim's visual disturbances, but noted that she was used to the effects of 
these diseases, and actually saw better at night. 78 Most importantly, the 
expert testified that the victim would be able to identify a person at a 
certain distance, and could pick a picture out of a book of photographs. 79 
The defendant was convicted on charges of unnatural rape, kidnapping, 
armed robbery, and assault and battery. 80 The Appeals Court confirmed 
the convictions. 81 One of the bases of the defendant's appeal was that the 
trial judge improperly admitted the opinion testimony of the ophthal-
mologist expert concerning the victim's ability to identify the defendant. 82 
The defendant argued that the expert's testimony was beyond the scope 
of his expertise, based on scientific principles not yet accepted as a proper 
basis for expert testimony, and unnecessary to the jury's determination 
whether the victim's identification was unreliable. 83 
The Supreme Judicial Court recognized the possibility that a jury might 
rely on the apparent trustworthiness of an expert's opinion "to erase 
otherwise reasonable doubts in their minds." 84 It concluded, however, 
that there was no such danger in this case. 85 The Court emphasized that 
the expert used the term "identify" to describe the victim's visual ability 
to distinguish the features of a person she saw at a certain distance, not to 
refer to her ability to identify an individual as a person she had seen 
earlier. 86 Because the doctor's testimony referred only to the victim's 
visual acuity, the Court stated it was well within his field of expertise and 
73 ld. at 214, 446 N.E.2d at 56. 
74 Id. at 214-15, 446 N.E.2d at 56. 
75 Id. at 208, 446 N.E.2d at 52. 
76 Commonwealth v. Sowers, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 975 (1982). 
77 388 Mass. at 208, 446 N.E.2d at 52. The defendant also contended on appeal that the 
judge's questions to prospective jurors at voir dire did not sufficiently seek potential racial 
bias.ld. 
78 Id. at 215, 446 N.E.2d at 56. 
76 ld. 
80 ld. 
81 ld. 
82 Id. at 215-16, 446 N.E.2d at 56. The Court compared Commonwealth v. Middleton, 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 902 ( 1978) (rescript), which upheld exclusion of expert testimony concerning 
stress and cross-racial eyewitness identification. 388 Mass. at 215-16, 446 N.E.2d at 56. 
83 388 Mass. at 218, 446 N.E.2d at 57. 
84 Id. at 218, 446 N.E.2d at 57-58. 
85Jd. 
86 Id. at 215, 446 N.E.2d at 56. 
7
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was concerned with a matter on which the jury was not equally capable of 
drawing conclusions. 87 The Court also noted that the trial judge gave 
lengthy and correct instructions to the jury, and advised it that it 
could accept or reject the expert's testimony, and that an expert was no 
more or less believable than any other witness. 88 Because the jury most 
likely understood the doctor's testimony solely as expert medical opinion 
on the victim's visual capabilities, the Court held that its admission was 
not improper. 89 
Francis and Sowers clarify the generally accepted rule that expert 
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is inadmissible. 
While the Court in Sowers held that testimony by an ophthalmologist 
concerning an eyewitness's ability to identify the defendant was admissi-
ble, 90 it did not depart from the basic reasoning of earlier cases. The 
expert testimony in Sowers dealt with the eyewitness's ability to see any 
person, and was only necessary because her vision differs from that ofthe 
average juror's. 91 In contrast, in Francis, the expert testimony concerned 
the eyewitness's identification and recollection of the defendant's face in 
particular. The Court used the same inquiry in both cases: is the proposed 
testimony apt to be of assistance to the jury? The Court came to different 
conclusions in the two cases, however, because general principles of 
memory and perception have consistently been held to be within the 
common knowledge of the jury, and so not of any assistance. 92 Con-
versely, the seeing ability of one who is legally blind and an albino is a 
subject which requires expert opinion before a just result can be reached. 
In summary, the Supreme Judicial Court in Francis reaffirmed the 
principle that expert testimony impeaching the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony is properly excludable subject to the discretion of the trial 
judge. 93 In Sowers, however, the Court distinguished such general tes-
timony from medical opinion on a particular witness's ability to see. 94 The 
Court's decisions are consistent with the prior law in the Commonwealth, 
and with the policy of leaving to the jury the determination of a witness's 
credibility. 
§ 11.2. Admissibility of Hypnotically Aided Testimony at Criminal Trial.* 
The question whether the hypnotically aided testimony 1 of a prosecution 
87 Francis, 390 Mass. at 95, 453 N.E.2d at 1207. 
88 Sowers, 388 Mass. at 218, 446 N .E.2d at 57-58. 
89 ld. 
90 ld. 
91 Id. at 215, 446 N.E.2d at 56. 
92 390 Mass. at 95, 453 N.E.2d at 1207. 
93 ld. 
94 388 Mass. at 218, 446 N.E.2d at 57. 
* By Ettore Santucci, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 11.2. 1 The expression "hypnotically aided testimony" refers to testimony by a 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/14
§ 11.2 EVIDENCE 337 
witness is admissible at trial has been an unsettled one since the Supreme 
Judicial Court first confronted the issue in the 1980 case of Common-
wealth v. A Juvenile. 2 When Juvenile was decided, the majority rule in 
other jurisdictions was to admit post-hypnotic testimony, viewing the fact 
of hypnosis as going merely to the credibility of the witness rather than to 
the admissibility of the evidence. 3 Consistent with that view, the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Juvenile showed an inclination to admit hypnotically 
aided testimony and leave for the jury any decision as to the weight to be 
accorded to such evidence. 4 In that case, however, due to the incomplete 
state of the record developed at trial, the Court raised, but could not 
reach, the issue of whether the hypnotically aided evidence should be 
suppressed. 5 The Court's inability to take an authoritative position in 
Juvenile left many questions unanswered, including whether evidence 
elicited under hypnosis is admissible; whether post-hypnotic statements 
that were developed as a result of hypnosis are inadmissible or whether 
the hypnosis underlying a witness's testimony is merely a factor going to 
credibility; and whether a hypnotized witness is disqualified from testify-
ing as to matters recalled before the hypnosis. 6 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth 
v. Kater 7 answered all the questions left open by Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile. In Kater the Court held that the testimony of a prosecution 
witness as to matters recalled only following hypnosis is per se inadmissi-
ble in criminal trials in Massachusetts. 9 The Court also held that tes-
timony by a witness, who has been the subject of hypnotic sessions, as to 
matters the witness recalled before hypnosis, is normally admissible sub-
ject to certain guidelines to guarantee the reliability of pre-hypnotic mem-
ory. 10 Moreover, the Court held that even if certain testimony as to 
pre-hypnotic memory from a previously hypnotized witness is admitted 
into evidence, the opponent is entitled to demonstrate to the jury the 
possible effects of hypnosis on the credibility of the testimony. 11 
The defendant in Kater had been convicted of kidnapping and murder-
witness as to a fact that became available as a result of or following hypnosis. It refers not 
only to statements made by the witness during the state of hypnosis, but also to statements 
made after hypnosis as to facts that the witness could not recall before hypnosis. 
2 381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980). See Note, Evidence, 1980 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAw § 1.3, for a detailed analysis of the case. 
3 Note, Evidence, supra note 2, at 27 n.3. 
4 381 Mass. at 730, 412 N.E.2d at 342. 
5 /d. at 729, 412 N.E.2d at 341. 
6 See Note, Evidence, supra note 2. 
7 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983). 
9 /d. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1193-94. 
10 /d. at 521, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
11 388 Mass. at 533-34, 447 N .E.2d at 1198. 
9
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ing a high school girV2 The girl's body was recovered in a forest two 
months after her bicycle had been found lying on a street near her home. 13 
Shortly before the time when the girl was last seen riding her bicycle on 
that street, five witnesses saw the defendant's car on or near the same 
street. 14 Two of the witnesses identified the defendant as the driver of the 
car. 15 There was other circumstantial evidence of the fact that defendant 
had been driving his car on the street where the girl's bicycle was found 
and that the defendant had struck the bicycle. 16 Four witnesses were 
subjects of hypnotic sessions in the course of the investigation. 17 At least 
one witness made statements after the hypnotic session as to matters that 
she could not remember before hypnosis. 18 The police did not make a 
record of what each witness knew before hypnosis, what the hypnotist 
knew of the crime, or what occurred just before and during each session. 19 
The "hypnotist" was a barely or minimally qualified police officer. 20 It 
was uncertain what parts, if any, of the witnesses' testimony were devel-
oped through, during, or subsequent to the hypnotic sessions and what 
parts were the product of pre-hypnotic memory. 21 Over the defendant's 
objection, the trial judge ruled the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses 
admissible. 22 
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and kidnap-
ping, from which he appealed. 23 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the 
12 /d. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1193. 
13 /d. at 522, 447 N.E.2d at 1193. 
14 /d. at 522, 447 N.E.2d at 1193-94. 
15fd. 
16 /d. at 522, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. In particular, the defendant's car had a nine-inch black 
mark on its right front fender. The girl's bicycle had a nine-inch rubber plug around the left 
end of the handlebar. /d. at 522-23, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. A handprint was noticed by a 
witness near where the girl's bicycle was found./d. at 523, 447 N .E.2d at 1194. A print found 
to be from the defendant's car tire was also found on the street. I d. The defendant had his car 
washed twice on the day the bicycle was found, once before and once after the time when 
the girl was discovered missing. /d. 
17 /d. at 523, 447 N .E.2d at 1194. The Court found that at least three of the witnesses had 
actually been hypnotized. /d. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. 
18 /d. at 532, 447 N.E.2d at 1199. The witness testified that before hypnosis she recalled 
that the driver of the car had a bulky object on the passenger's seat. /d. After the hypnotic 
sessions, the same witness recalled that the driver's arm was stretched out across the 
passenger's side as if he were holding some object and that the material of the bulky object 
was "like a blanket-type." /d. 
19 /d. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. 
20 /d. The police officer who conducted the hypnotic sessions was so poorly qualified that 
the judge did not permit him to give an opinion whether the witnesses had been hypnotized 
at all. /d. 
21 /d. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194-95. 
22 /d. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. 
23 ld. 
10
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judgment, on the grounds that it was at least partially based on inadmissi-
ble hypnotically aided testimony. 24 The Kater Court took for granted that 
in Massachusetts, as in most jurisdictions, testimony given under hyp-
nosis as well as pretrial statements made by a hypnotized subject are 
always inadmissible at trial. 25 The Court in Kater focused on post-
hypnotic testimony concerning either matters remembered by the witness 
before hypnosis or matters that became available only after hypnosis and 
concluded that, in the circumstances of the Kater case, the unqualified 
admission of testimony from hypnotized witnesses created a substantial 
likelihood that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. 26 The Court there-
fore ordered a new trial. 27 
The Kater Court adopted the modem test for the admissibility of 
hypnotically-aided testimony, which is modeled after the standard devel-
oped in Frye v,., United States 28 for the admissibility of the results of a 
lie-detector test. 29 The Frye standard considers whether the contested 
procedure has gained such standing and recognition among authorities in 
the field as to justify the courts in admitting expert testimony in support of 
its reliability in any given case. 30 The Court in Kater held that hypnoti-
cally aided testimony will be rejected unless and until the reliability of 
hypnosis as a means of refreshing recollection has gained general accep-
tance by experts in the field. 31 
Regardless of whether hypnosis may or may not be considered a scien-
tific process, the Court reasoned, the fundamental concern is whether a 
jury can realistically evaluate the effect of hypnosis on the reliability of 
24 /d. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. 
25 /d. at 524-25, 447 N.E.2d at 1195; see also Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 381 Mass. 
727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980). See generally Note, Evidence, supra note 2, at 24, 26. 
26 388 Mass. at 520-21, 447 N.E.2d at 1192. 
27 /d. at 521, 534, 447 N.E.2d at 1193, 1200. The Court noted that since the evidence 
against the defendant was circumstantial only, the testimony of the four witnesses who had 
been hypnotized was crucial for the prosecution. ld. at 534, 447 N.E.2d at 1200. Such 
testimony was admitted by the trial court judge in its entirety, although some of it was 
developed through and after hypnosis. /d. Moreover, there was no record as to what the 
witnesses recalled before hypnosis and no safeguards that would tend to assure that the 
pre-hypnotic memory of witnesses would not be affected by hypnosis. /d. Finally, the jury 
was not made aware that hypnosis would have a negative rather than positive effect on the 
reliability of a witness's testimony./d. The Court found, however, that even apart from the 
hypnotically aided testimony, there was sufficient evidence to warrant the defendant's 
conviction, and therefore required a new trial. /d. at 521, 447 N.E.2d at 1193. 
28 293 F. Supp. 1013 (D.D.C. 1923). 
29 /d. at 1014. The Court in Frye held that the "systolic blood pressure deception test" 
had not gained sufficient scientific recognition among physiological and psychological au-
thorities to make its results admissible as evidence. /d. 
30 /d. 
31 388 Mass. at 525-27, 447 N.E.2d at 1195. 
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testimony. 32 The Court relied on the reasoning of a recent Arizona Su-
preme Court case33 that the "aura of mysticism" surrounding hypnosis in 
the layperson's mind is likely to lead the jury to place greater emphasis on 
hypnotically aided testimony than it deserves. 34 The Court in Kater took 
the position that the likelihood of prejudice inherent in the danger of 
misuse of hypnotically aided testimony by the jury warrants a per se rule 
of inadmissibility for such evidence, so long as there is no general scien-
tific acceptance of hypnosis as a reliable means of refreshing recollec-
tion. 35 The Kater Court refused to adopt the approach taken by other 
courts36 which would allow each party in every case to offer expert 
testimony on the effect of hypnosis in the specific circumstances. 37 Ac-
cording to the Court, the status of hypnosis under the Frye "general 
acceptance" standard is such that a time-consuming and expensive case-
by-case approach to the admissibility of hypnotically aided testimony is 
simply not justified. 38 
The Court in Kater briefly mentioned some of the reasons offered by 
experts, and noted by other courts, to support its conclusion that hyp-
nosis is not a generally accepted method of refreshing recall. 39 The Court 
first noted the danger of suggestion and confabulation in the development 
of evidence through hypnosis. 40 Other courts have pointed out, the Court 
stated, that hypnotized persons, being extremely susceptible, tend to 
superimpose onto their memories any fantasies or suggestions deliber-
ately or unintentionally communicated by the hypnotist. 41 The Court 
observed that the hypnotized witness becomes attuned to the hypnotist 
32 Id. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1195. The Court in Kater relied on several cases from other 
jurisdictions, which had changed the status of the law concerning hypnotically aided tes-
timony since its 1980 decision in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile. See, e.g., State ex rei. 
Collins v. Superior Court for the County of Maricopa, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); 
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 4% Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981). 
33 State ex rei. Collins v. Superior Court for the County of Maricopa, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 
P.2d 1266 (1982). 
34 Id. at 186, 644 P.2d at 1272. 
35 388 Mass. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1195-96 (citing State ex rei. Collins v. Superior Court 
for the County of Maricopa, 132 Ariz. 180, 198-99 nn.3 & 4, 644 P.2d 1266, 1284-85 nn.3 & 4 
(1982)). 
36 State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,538,432 A.2d 86,93 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 
691, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (1981). 
37 388 Mass. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1196. 
38 ld. 
39 Id. at 527, 447 N.E.2d at 11%. 
40 Id. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 11%. 
41 See, e.g., State ex rei. Collins v. Superior Court for the County of Maricopa, 132 Ariz. 
180, 183-85, 644 P.2d 1266, 1269-71; People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. 
Rptr. 243 (1982). 
12
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and tends to desire to please him. 42 According to the Court, the witness 
may then tend to respond in accordance with what he or she perceives the 
desired response to be and to fill the gaps in his or her memory. 43 Another 
result of hypnosis, the Court said, may be to decrease the subject's 
critical judgment, so that what the subject "remembered" during hyp-
nosis becomes his or her permanent memory regardless of what in fact he 
or she previously remembered. 44 No expert, the Court found, can deter-
mine whether the evidence developed through hypnosis is the product of 
actual memory, pseudo-memories, outright falsehood, suggestion, or con-
fabulation. 45 For all these reasons, 46 the Court held that no procedural 
safeguards can insure the reliability of hypnotically aided testimony so as 
to render it admissible in a criminal trial. 47 
The Court in Kater pointed out a further effect of hypnosis on both 
hypnotically aided testimony and post-hypnotic testimony concerning 
matters that the witness remembered before trial. A previously hyp-
notized witness, the Court stated, shows an increased confidence and 
conviction as to the veracity of his or her memory of matters discussed 
during the hypnotic sessions, even though neither the witness himself nor 
the hypnotist has any way of distinguishing between actual memories and 
pseudo-memories. 48 According to the Court, this effect of hypnosis on the 
attitude of a witness may affect the jury's evaluation of the credibility of 
testimony and may tend to immunize the witness from cross-
examination. 49 As a result, the Court held that hypnotically aided tes-
timony concerning matters not remembered before hypnosis is always 
inadmissible, and a witness's testimony as to his pre-hypnotic recollec-
tions is not automatically admissible. 50 The Court refused, however, to 
42 388 Mass. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 11%. 
4:l ld. 
44 ld. 
45 ld. 
46 More exhaustive and detailed analyses of all the reasons mentioned by the Kater Court 
for excluding hypnotically aided testimony are contained in State ex rei. Collins v. Superior 
Court for the County of Maricopa, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982), and People v. 
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982). 
47 388 Mass. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 1196. 
46 Id. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 1197. 
49 Jd. Another court wrote that "prehypnosis uncertainty becomes molded, in light of 
additional recall experienced under hypnosis, into certitude, with the subject unaware of any 
suggestions that he acted upon or any confabulation in which he engaged. The subject's firm 
belief in the veracity of his enhanced recollection is honestly held and cannot be undermined 
through cross-examination." State ex rei. Collins v. Superior Court for the County of 
Maricopa, 132 Ariz. 180, 188, 644 P.2d 1266, 1274 (quoting Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 
4% Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981)). 
50 388 Mass. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 1197. 
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take the extreme position, as have other courts, 51 of disqualifying a 
previously hypnotized witness from testifying as to matters remembered 
beforehand. 52 
The Court's ruling in Kater on the issue of the admissibility of post-
hypnotic testimony concerning pre-hypnotic memory distinguished be-
tween ( 1) pre-hypnotic recollections which were not the subject of inquiry 
during the hypnotic sessions and (2) pre-hypnotic memory discussed 
under hypnosis. 53 In the former case, the Court held, the testimony is 
always admissible, since hypnosis in no way affects its reliability. 54 In the 
latter case, however, according to the Kater Court, the effect of hypnosis 
on the witness's manner and confidence as to pre-hypnotic recollections 
must be considered by the judge in deciding initially whether the tes-
timony should be admitted into evidence. 55 For purposes of this ruling, 
the Court held that the proponent has the burden of establishing what the 
witness remembered before hypnosis by producing a careful record of it. 56 
The opponent, the Court suggested, should challenge the admissibility of 
the evidence in a motion to suppress or a motion in limine. 57 According to 
the Kater Court, the judge may rely on the presence or absence of the 
procedural safeguards listed by the Court in Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile 58 as guidelines to decide whether the hypnotic sessions were 
51 See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,51-56,66-67,641 P.2d 775,787-89,794-95, 
181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 285-86, 302 (1982). 
52 388 Mass. at 528, 528-29 nn.5 & 7, 447 N.E.2d at 1197 & nn. 5 & 7. 
53 Id. at 529, 447 N.E.2d at 1197. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 529, 531, 447 N.E.2d at 1197, 1198. 
56 ld. 
57 Id. at 531, 447 N.E.2d at 1198. 
58 381 Mass. 727, 732-33 n.8, 412 N.E.2d 339, 343 n.8 (1980). The following procedural 
safeguards were listed by the Court in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile: 
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or psycholo-
gist trained in the use of hypnosis. (2) The qualified professional conducting the 
hypnotic session should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecutor, 
investigator or the defense. (3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law 
enforcement personnel prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form so that 
subsequently the extent of the information the subject received from the hypnotist 
may be determined. (4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain 
from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them, 
carefully avoiding adding new elements to the witness's description of the events. (5) 
All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded so that a 
permanent record is available for comparison and study to establish that the witness 
has not received information or suggestion which might later be reported as having 
been first described by the subject during hypnosis. Videotape should be employed if 
possible, but should not be mandatory. (6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should 
be present during any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic 
testing and post-hypnotic interview. 
Id. The Court in Kater, however, noted that these safeguards should not be applied 
14
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conducted in such a manner as not to undermine the reliability of tes-
timony on the witness's pre-hypnotic memory. 59 The Kater Court held 
that if the judge admits the testimony, the opposing party must be given an 
opportunity to demonstrate to the jury the effects of hypnosis on the 
witness's credibility. 60 In appropriate circumstances, the Court stated, the 
opponent may be entitled to an instruction that the jury consider the fact 
of hypnosis and the circumstances under which it was conducted in 
evaluating the weight of the evidence presented. 61 
The Kater Court specified exactly how the rules it announced should be 
applied to future cases. According to the Court, the absolute bar to the 
admissibility of hypnotically .aided testimony will make its admission 
reversible error in !very case still in the process of being appealed, so long 
as the issue was properly presented for appellate review and there was 
prejudice to the defendant. 62 The Court held, however, that the rule 
permitting the use of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness 
concerning matters remembered before hypnosis, so long as appropriate 
safeguards guarantee its reliability, will only be applied to hypnotic ses-
sions taking place after the date of the Kater opinion. 63 Finally, the Court 
indicated in dicta that these rules would seem equally applicable in civil as 
well as in criminal cases. 64 
The Court recognized that its holding in Kater will have the effect of 
reducing substantially the use of hypnosis to develop evidence against a 
criminal defendant. 65 The Court, however, left open the possibility that 
future developments in the scientific knowledge about hypnosis will, 
pursuant to the Frye approach, 66 justify a change in the law of evidence 
concerning hypnotically aided testimony. 67 Until that happens, the Court 
noted, not all possible uses of hypnosis as an aid to gather evidence in the 
inflexibly. 388 Mass. at 530 n.8, 447 N.E.2d at ll98 n.8. The hypnotist need not always be a 
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, so long as he or she is qualified in the use of hypnosis 
and independent of the investigation of the crime. /d. In special circumstances, third parties, 
such as the parent of a child, may be present at the hypnotic sessions. I d. The preservation 
of the witness's pre-hypnotic memory does not require that all interrogations of potential 
witnesses be tape recorded. ld. 
ss 388 Mass. at 529-30, 447 N.E.2d at ll97-98. 
60 Id. at 531, 447 N.E.2d at ll98. 
61 ld. 
62 /d. at 530, 447 N .E.2d at 1198. The Court stated that after Juvenile it expected counsel 
to raise a timely objection to the admission of testimony from a previously hypnotized 
witness. /d. The Court therefore indicated that it would not allow counsel to raise the issue 
for the first time on a motion for a new trial in a post-Juvenile case. Id. 
63 Jd. at 530, 447 N.E.2d at ll98. 
64 Id. at 530 n.9, 447 N.E.2d at ll98 n.9. 
65 Id. at 531, 447 N.E.2d at ll98. 
66 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
67 388 Mass. at 531, 447 N.E.2d at ll98. 
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context of criminal prosecutions are precluded. 68 Although hypnosis may 
not be used to develop evidence at the judicial stages of a prosecution, the 
Court noted that it is a valuable tool at the investigative stages. 69 The 
Kater Court stated in dicta that evidence, other than hypnotically aided 
testimony, discovered as a result of the hypnotism of a witness is not 
necessarily inadmissible, because corroborating evidence is not suscepti-
ble to the same dangers of unreliability as hypnotically aided testimony. 70 
The Court even raised the possibility that the hypnotically aided tes-
timony itself may become admissible when the memory restored by 
hypnosis is corroborated by sufficient tangible evidence. 71 Finally, the 
Court pointed out that a criminal defendant who has been the subject of 
hypnosis may have a constitutional right to testify, even though his 
testimony includes matters not remembered prior to the hypnosis. 72 
The Court in Kater provided clear and certain answers to all of the 
questions left open in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile. The Court correctly 
rejected the view that the use of hypnosis goes only to the credibility of 
testimony, rather than to its admissibility. The danger inherent in the 
"credibility" approach is that the jury will place undue weight on hypnot-
ically aided testimony and that the judge's limiting instructions will be 
ineffective in preventing such misuse of evidence by the jury. The '' gen-
eral acceptance" approach of Frye v. United States,13 adopted by the 
Court in Kater, is the proper standard because it prevents arguably 
unreliable evidence from being present.ed to thejury, as long as experts do 
not generally agree that the process used to develop such evidence offers 
sufficient guarantees of reliability to eliminate the danger that the jury will 
be misled. At the present time hypnosis does not offer sufficient guaran-
tees in this regard and, therefore, hypnotically aided testimony must be 
suppressed. It is quite possible that in the future hypnosis will r,each a 
stage where experts will generally agree that the process is not so suggest-
ive as to preclude reliability. At that time, the Frye test will allow the 
courts to take notice of such developments and to admit hypnotically 
aided testimony at trial. · 
The Kater Court also took the appropriate course in distinguishing 
between hypnotically aided testimony and post-hypnotic statements as to 
matters remembered by the witness before hypnosis. The Court properly 
refused to hold that, once hypnotized, a witness is forever disqualified 
from testifying at trial as to any matter discussed during the hypnotic 
68 ld. at 528 n.6, 447 N.E.2d at ll97 n.6. 
69 !d. 
7o Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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sessions, even though certain events were remembered by the witness 
prior to the sessions. Such an absolute rule would be easy to apply, but 
would most likely suppress important and reliable evidence. The Court, 
therefore, was correct in adopting the "credibility" approach with regard 
to post-hypnotic testimony concerning pre-hypnotic memory, because 
here the dangers attendant on hypnotically aided testimony are greatly 
reduced. 
The "credibility" approach, when applied to testimony as to pre-
hypnotic memory, offers several advantages. First, it does not exclude a 
priori important and arguably reliable evidence, while at the same time it 
allows the defendant to present evidence of the possible unreliability of 
such testimony. Second, the credibility approach creates an incentive for 
the prosecution to conduct the hypnotic sessions in such a way as not to 
undermine the reliability of such testimony by, for example, preserving an 
accurate record of the witness's pre-hypnotic memory and adopting ap-
propriate procedural safeguards during hypnosis. Third, the usefulness of 
hypnosis in the investigative process is preserved by allowing police and 
prosecutors to hypnotize a potential witness, without having to make the 
difficult choice concerning whether the likelihood of uncovering addi-
tional evidence warrants the sacrifice of the witness's testimony at trial. 
Finally, the use of limiting instructions to the jury, when warranted, 
reduces the risk that the jury will place undue weight on the testimony of a 
previously hypnotized witness, when the fact of hypnosis affects the 
witness's attitude and demeanor. 
The significance of Kater for the practitioner is threefold. First, defense 
attorneys in the process of appealing convictions where hypnotically 
aided testimony was admitted at trial against the defendant will be able to 
secure an automatic reversal, so long as prejudice is shown and the issue 
of admissibility was preserved for appellate review. 74 Second, the defense 
74 This application of Kater is illustrated by Commonwealth v. Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 
451 N.E.2d 128 (1983), a case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court three months after 
Kater. In Brouillet the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and unarmed burglary. 
/d. at 605, 451 N .E.2d at 129. Prior to being hypnotized the victim gave a description of her 
assailant, but did not identify the defendant as the assailant. I d. at 606, 451 N.E.2d at 129. In 
the course of a hypnotic session, the victim was shown an array of photographs including a 
picture of the defendant. ld. at 606-07, 451 N.E.2d at 129. Although the victim could not 
make a positive identification while under hypnosis, she was shown the same array of 
photographs eight days after being hypnotized and at that point identified the defendant as 
her assailant. I d. at 607, 451 N.E.2d at 129. The victim's testimony, including her identifica-
tion of the defendant, was admitted at triaL/d. at 607,451 N.E.2d at 130. The Court reversed 
the conviction, finding that the case was controlled entirely by Kater.ld. Since the victim's 
identification of the defendant as her assailant became available after the hypnotic session, 
the case was clearly within the Kater absolute bar against hypnotically aided testimony, and 
the testimony of the victim had to be excluded./d. at 608, 451 N.E.2d at 131. The Court in 
Brouillet could not conclude that without referring to the victim's identification the prosecu-
17
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attorney seeking to have the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness 
excluded can raise the issue in a pre-trial motion to suppress or in a 
motion in limine. The ruling on the motion will tum on three different 
elements: whether the testimony concerned matters that became available 
through or after the hypnotic sessions as opposed to matters that the 
witness remembered prior to hypnosis; whether the matters of pre-
hypnotic memory were the subject of inquiry during the hypnotic session; 
and, if this second condition existed, whether the hypnotic sessions were 
conducted with the procedural safeguards suggested by the Court to 
minimize the adverse effects of hypnosis on the reliability of testimony. 
Finally, even if the pretrial motion or motion in limine to suppress is 
denied, defense counsel still has an opportunity at trial to present evi-
dence to the jury to show that hypnosis adversely affected the credibility 
of the testimony, in terms of the witness's attitude, confidence, and 
manner of testifying. 
§ 11.3. Admissibility of Composite Sketches.* While law enforcement 
officials have successfully used composite sketches to facilitate witness 
identification during criminal investigations, courts in Massachusetts 1 as 
well as other jurisdictions2 have disagreed on the evidentiary value of 
composite sketches presented during the course of a trial. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court, when first presented with the issue of the 
admissibility of these sketches in evidence, disallowed the introduction of 
a composite, treating it as equivalent to extrajudicial statements made by 
the witness to the police. 3 As a result of this view, composite sketches 
were deemed inadmissible as hearsay evidence. 4 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Judicial Court has demonstrated 
an increasing tendency to permit the use of other forms of extrajudicial 
identifications as evidence. 5 For example, in several cases the Court has 
tion would be unable to make out a prima facie case and therefore declined to dismiss the 
indictment. I d. at 608-09, 451 N .E.2d at 131. Accordingly, the Court set aside the verdict and 
remanded the case for a new trial. ld. at 609, 451 N.E.2d at 131. 
* Edward F. Mahoney, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 11.3. 1 Compare Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969) 
(conviction reversal due in part to admission of composite) with Commonwealth v. Blaney, 
387 Mass. 628,442 N.E.2d 389 (1982) (conviction affirmed where admission of composite did 
not prejudice defendant). 
2 Compare United States v. Moskowitz, 581 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
871 (1978) (composite admissible because not hearsay) with Commonwealth v. Rothlis-
berger, 197 Pa. Super. 451, 178 A.2d 853 (1962) (composite inadmissible hearsay evidence). 
3 Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 327, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1969). 
4 SeeP. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 170-71, 246 (5th ed. 1981). 
• In addition to composite sketches, examples of extrajudicial evidence include identifica-
tions by witnesses at lineups and identification by a witness from an array of police 
photographs. 
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allowed the admission of extrajudicial statements, made by a witness in 
the course of a pre-trial identification, for the purpose of corroborating 
that witness's in-court identification. 6 The Court reasoned that extrajudi-
cial statements, when used to corroborate in-court testimony, are not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead to establish 
the reliability of the testimony. Such statements, therefore, do not consti-
tute hearsay. 7 In other decisions, the Court has relaxed even further the 
rule prohibiting the admission of extrajudicial identifications by allowing 
prior identifications not only as corroboration of in-court testimony, but 
also as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt, despite the hearsay 
rule. 8 According to the Court, prior identifications are frequently more 
reliable than in-court identifications because they are made under less 
suggestive circumstances and at a time closer to the commission of the 
offense. 9 As a result of these rulings, it became unclear whether the Court 
would continue to find composite sketches inadmissible or would further 
expand the use of extrajudicial identifications by allowing introduction of 
the sketches into evidence. 10 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Weichel/, 11 the Supreme 
Judicial Court reassessed its position regarding the use of composite 
sketches during a criminal trial. The Court held that a composite sketch, 
prepared by police with the aid of an Identikit, 12 was admissible as 
substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt absent proof that it had been 
prepared under suggestive circumstances. 13 In allowing the prosecutor to 
use the composite as substantive evidence, the Court relied extensively 
6 Commonwealth v. Sheeran, 370 Mass. 82, 87, 345 N.E.2d 362, 366 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Swenson, 368Mass. 268, 273, 331 N.E.2d 893, 897 (1975); Commonwealth v. 
Vanetzian, 350 Mass. 491, 497, 215 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1966). 
7 See Commonwealth v. Sheeran, 370 Mass. 82, 87, 345 N.E.2d 362, 366 (1976). For a 
brief overview of the hearsay rule and the rationale behind the rule, see Robertson, Evi-
dence, 1980 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ l.l, at 1. 
8 Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 458, 381 N.E.2d 582, 600 (1978); Common-
wealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 408, 381 N.E.2d 123, 129 (1978); Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 367 Mass. 737, 738-39, 327 N.E.2d 871, 873-74 (1975). 
9 Commonwealth v. Torres, 367 Mass. 737, 737, 327 N.E.2d 871, 873 (1975). 
10 The Court was confronted with the issue of the admissibility of composite sketches in 
Commonwealth v. Blaney, 387 Mass. 628, 442 N .E.2d 389 (1982). The Court avoided making 
a ruling, however, by deciding the case on other grounds. See infra notes 23-25 and 
accompanying text. 
11 390 Mass. 62, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (1983). 
12 An Identikit is a device whereby a witness, using transparent overlays, reconstructs the 
face of a suspect feature by feature. This process allows the witness to constantly change 
facial features until he is satisfied with the picture of the suspect. See Cohen, Number of 
Features and Alternatives Per Feature, in Reconstructing Faces With the Identi-kit, 1 J. 
PoLICE SciENCE & ADMIN. 349 (1973). All of the composites discussed in this chapter were 
prepared with the aid of an Identikit. 
13 390 Mass. at 73, 453 N.E.2d at 1045. 
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on its liberalized approach to the evidentiary use of other forms of extra-
judicial identifications. 14 
In Weichell, a witness testified that upon returning from a drive-in 
movie, during which he consumed four or five beers, he heard four 
"bangs" and turned to see a man running from a parking lot. 15 The 
witness claimed that he viewed the man's face for approximately one 
second as the man passed under a street light. 16 Shortly after making these 
observations, the witness assisted a police detective in constructing a 
composite sketch with the aid of an Identikit. 17 The witness, after slightly 
modifying the composite with a pencil, stated that it represented an 
accurate depiction of the man he had seen. 18 In addition to aiding in the 
construction of the composite, the witness selected the defendant's pic-
ture from an array of nine photographs and pointed out the defendant to 
the police while the defendant was on the street. 19 
Based on this evidence, the police arrested the defendant, and he was 
tried for murder. 20 During his trial the prosecutor successfully introduced 
into evidence the composite sketch of the suspect. 21 In addition, the 
prosecutor emphasized during his closing argument the likeness between 
the composite and the defendant. 22 After the jury convicted the defen-
dant, he appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court on various grounds, 23 
including the trial court's decision to admit the composite sketch in 
evidence. 24 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction. 25 In considering 
the admissibility of the sketch, the Court first discussed two of its prior 
decisions involving the use of composites as evidence in criminal trials. 
The Court noted that in the most recent ofthese cases, Commonwealth v. 
14 Id. at 71, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. 
15 Id. at 65-66, 453 N.E.2d at 1041. 
16 Id. at 66, 453 N.E.2d at 1041. 
17 ld. 
18Jd. 
19 Id. at 66-67, 453 N.E.2d at 1041. 
20 Id. at 63, 453 N.E.2d at 1040. 
21 See id. at 68, 453 N.E.2d at 1042. 
22 Id. at 69 & n.6, 453 N.E.2d at 1042-43 & n.6. 
23 In addition to the issue of the composite, the defendant claimed that the trial judge had 
erred in l) refusing to exclude evidence relating to the defendant's motive; 2) allowing the 
motion which excluded evidence tending to show that other persons possessed a motive; 3) 
refusing to exclude the defendant's profile mugshot; 4) allowing an enlarged copy of a 
photograph of the defendant taken at the time of his arrest; and 5) excluding photographs of 
the scene of the crime at night and the testimony ofthe photographer who took them. !d. at 
73-78, 453 N.E.2d at 1045-48. The Court, however, found no error and affirmed the convic-
tion. Id. at 64, 453 N.E.2d at 1040. 
24 Id. at 63, 453 N.E.2d at 1040. 
25 Id. at 64, 453 N.E.2d at 1040. 
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Blaney, 26 it had not reached the issue of whether the trial court had 
improperly admitted the composite because it found that the admission of 
the composite had not prejudiced the defendant. 27 The Court acknowl-
edged, however, that in Weichell, the composite, if wrongly admitted, 
probably prejudiced the defendant because the prosecutor emphasized 
the composite's resemblance to the defendant during the closing argu-
ment.28 
In addition to Blaney, the Court also referred to an earlier case, Com-
monwealth v. McKenna, 29 in which the Court had disallowed the admis-
sion of a composite in evidence, ruling that a composite could not be used 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 30 The Court limited McKenna, 
however, by reasoning that the McKenna Court had not considered the 
use of a composite for the purpose of corroborating the in-court identifica-
tion of the witness. 31 The Weichell Court then cited several cases which 
had allowed in evidence other methods of extrajudicial identification for 
the purpose of corroborating in-court identifications. 32 These decisions, 
according to the Court, were justified on the grounds that the out-of-court 
identifications had not been offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, and therefore did not constitute hearsay. 33 
The Court, however, did not rely entirely on a corroborative function 
analysis. Emphasizing its more recent decisions, the Court pointed to its 
own liberalization of the admission of extrajudicial identifications, permit-
ting their use as substantive evidence of guilt. 34 The Court noted that the 
admissibility of such evidence could not be justified in these recent cases 
under a theory that the evidence performed solely a corroborative func-
tion, since no in-court identification was involved. 35 The identifications 
could not, therefore, in the Court's view, escape being categorized as 
hearsay evidence. 36 The Court concluded, nevertheless, that it had admit-
~6 387 Mass. 628, 442 N.E.2d 389 (1982). 
27 Weichel/, 390 Mass at 68-69, 453 N.E.2d at 1042. See Blaney, 387 Mass at 633, 442 
N.E.2d at 393. 
28 390 Mass. at 69, 453 N.E.2d at 1042-43. 
29 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969). 
3o Id. at 326-27, 244 N.E.2d at 567. 
31 390 Mass. at 70, 453 N.E.2d at 1043. 
32 /d. For cases holding that extrajudicial identification is not hearsay when introduced for 
the purpose of corroborating prior out-of-court identification, see supra note 5. 
33 390 Mass. at 70, 453 N.E.2d at 1043. 
34 Id. at 71, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. For cases holding that extrajudicial identification can be 
used as substantive evidence, see supra note 7. 
35 390 Mass. at 71,453 N.E.2d at 1044. This issue often arose in cases where a witness had 
positively identified a suspect soon after the incident, but due to a time lapse, could not make 
a positive identification in court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 459, 
381 N.E.2d 582, 600 (1978). 
36 390 Mass. at 71, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. 
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ted these statements because the pre-trial identification, made in less 
suggestive surroundings, probably had greater testimonial value than the 
one made in court. 37 Furthermore, the Court noted, both the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence 
had adopted this position allowing prior identifications provided the dec-
larant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. 38 
Having established that a court could properly admit prior identifica-
tions at a criminal trial, including statements by a witness describing the 
suspect, the Court stated that it would be illogical to admit descriptive 
statements into evidence but exclude a composite sketch. 39 The Court 
claimed that a composite sketch constituted merely the sum of the iden-
tifying statements. 40 Accordingly, the Court found that trial courts could 
admit a composite in evidence by treating it in the same manner as it 
treated the statement which led to its creation. 41 
The Court concluded its discussion by imposing two conditions on the 
admissibility of a composite. First, the Court suggested that it would 
require more evidence of a composite's reliability absent other evidence 
of identification. 42 Second, the Court stated that it would not allow the use 
of a composite for identification purposes where the assembling of the 
composite was tainted, as by police suggestions during preparation. 43 In 
Weichell, however, the Court held that neither of these potential obstacles 
existed. 44 In fact, the Court noted that the defendant had not even sug-
37 Id. For a list of the cases cited, see supra note 7. 
38 390 Mass. at 71-72, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. Rule 801(d)(l)(C) of the Federal and the 
Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence states: "A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement, and the statement is ... one of identification of a person made after perceiving 
him." 
39 390 Mass. at 72, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. 
4{) ld. 
41 Id. Alternatively, according to the Court, it could have allowed the composite on the 
grounds that composites do not constitute a statement within the hearsay rule. Id. See 
United States v. Moskowitz, 581 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871 (1978); 
State v. Packard, 184 Conn. 258, 273-74, 439 A.2d 983, 991-92 (1981). 
Courts are not in total agreement as to the admissibility of composites. For cases holding 
that composites, as hearsay evidence, are inadmissible, see People v. Turner, 91 Ill. App. 2d 
436, 235 N.E.2d 317 (1968); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 
(1%9); People v. Jennings, 23 A.D.2d 621, 257 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1%5); Commonwealth v. 
Rothlisberger, 197 Pa. Super. 451, 178 A.2d 853 (1%2). For a case allowing admission of 
composite for corroboration only, see State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St. 2d 83, 54 Ohio Op. 2d 
222, 267 N.E.2d 291 (1971). For a case in agreement with the reasoning of the Weichell 
Court, see State v. Ginardi, 111 N.J. Super. 435, 268 A.2d 534, aff'd, 57 N.J. 438, 273 A.2d 
353 (1970). 
42 390 Mass. at 72 n.8, 453 N.E.2d at 1044-45 n.8. 
43 I d. at 72-73, 453 N .E.2d at 1045. 
44 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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gested that the drawing of the composite was tainted. 45 Having previously 
found that the composite did not constitute hearsay evidence, 46 the Court 
ruled that the composite was admissible as substantive evidence of iden-
tification. 47 
Two justices filed dissenting opinions focusing on the issue of the 
composite's admissibility. 48 Justice O'Connor argued that, for the reason 
stated in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Blaney, 49 the Court 
had improperly admitted the composite. 50 In Blaney, Justice O'Connor 
had reviewed the Court's rationale in earlier cases for allowing extrajudi-
cial identifications in evidence to prove a defendant's guilt. 51 According to 
Justice O'Connor, the Court had viewed such evidence as more reliable 
than in-court identification and thus allowed its admission as an exception 
to the hearsay o.de. 52 Justice O'Connor argued, however, that composites 
were not as reliable as other methods of prior identification and that the 
Court should treat them as falling within the hearsay rule. 53 He thus 
suggested that the Court should allow composites only for purposes of 
impeachment and rehabilitation, and not for purposes of proving the 
defendant's guilt. 54 
Justice Liacos also filed a dissenting opinion. 55 Like Justice O'Connor 
in Blaney, Justice Liacos distinguished the Identikit process from other 
methods of extrajudicial identification, arguing that given the current 
knowledge on the subject, composites might be less reliable than the other 
identification methods. 56 Justice Liacos suggested several reasons to 
question the reliability of a composite. He discu~sed the process by which 
a police official and witness construct a composite and questioned the 
ability of a witness to assemble an accurate picture of a suspect through 
this process. 57 He noted the differences between the reconstruction of a 
45 390 Mass. at 73, 453 N.E.2d at 1045. 
46 /d. at 72, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. 
47 /d. at 73, 453 N.E.2d at 1045. 
48 /d. at 79, 453 N.E.2d at 1048 (Liacos, J., dissenting); id. at 88, 453 N.E.2d at 1053 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a list of the other issues on appeal, see supra note 20. 
49 387 Mass. 628, 640-43, 442 N.E.2d 389, 397-99 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
50 Weiche/1, 390 Mass. at 88, 453 N.E.2d at 1053 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
51 387 Mass. 628, 641-42, 442 N.E.2d 389, 397-98 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 642, 442 N.E.2d at 398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 642-43, 442 N.E.2d at 398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
54 /d. at 643, 442 N.E.2d at 398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
55 390 Mass at 79, 453 N.E.2d at 1048 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
56 /d. at 81, 453 N.E.2d at 1049 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
57 Justice Liacos stated: 
To produce a composite, the witness's mental image of the offender first must be 
matched with individual facial features. Only after a number of individual features 
have been selected and assembled is the witness able to determine whether his mental 
image of the offender comports with the composite. By that point, either the witness's 
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face and the selection of a face from a photographic array. 58 Additionally, 
Justice Liacos expressed concern as to the inherent suggestiveness of the 
Identikit method, particularly in two situations. 59 First, he perceived 
difficulty where the police had already identified a suspect and thus 
prepared the composite with that individual in mind. 60 Second, Justice 
Liacos argued that when a witness had only a limited view of the suspect, 
his description of that suspect was particularly susceptible to sugges-
tion. 61 
As a result of these perceived inadequacies in the Identikit process, 
Justice Liacos argued that the Court should require trial courts to place 
the burden on the proponent of a composite to lay a foundation detailing 
the process by which the composite had been constructed. 62 This founda-
tion, according to Justice Liacos, should address the reliability of the 
composite process in general, and the reliability of the procedures used in 
the particular composite being offered. 63 A court would then determine 
the composite's admissibility according to traditional standards of rele-
vancy.64 
In Weichell, Justice Liacos would not have admitted the composite 
sketch for either substantive or corroborative purposes due to the absence 
of evidence demonstrating its reliability. 65 In addition to his general reser-
vations toward the reliability of composites, Justice Liacos stressed that 
the witness had viewed the defendant at night and for only a matter of 
seconds. 66 He also noted that the prosecutor had emphasized the compo-
site during her closing argument. 67 
Justice Liacos' and Justice O'Connor's emphasis on the reliability of 
composites as identification evidence highlights the difference between 
the viewpoints of the Court and of the dissenters. Both the majority and 
the dissent acknowledged that pre-trial identifications, due to their greater 
accuracy, serve a valuable function as substantive evidence. 68 The dis-
agreement centered on whether to include composite sketches in that 
group of pre-trial identification procedures which are admissible. The 
image may have been altered or the witness may be unable to decide which facial 
features are correct. 
Id. at 84, 453 N.E.2d at 1051 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
08 ld. at 81, 453 N.E.2d at 1049 (Llacos, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 84, 453 N.E.2d at 1051 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
6o Id. 
61 Id. at 84-85, 453 N.E.2d at 1051 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 81-82, 453 N.E.2d at 1049 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
6a Id. 
64 ld. at 83, 453 N.E.2d at 1050 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 79-81, 453 N.E.2d at 1048-49 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 80, 453 N.E.2d at 1048 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
67 /d. at 80, 453 N.E.2d at 1049 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
66 ld. at 71, 453 N.E.2d at 1044; id. at 87, 453 N.E.2d at 1052 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
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majority treated composites in the same manner as it did other identifica-
tion methods. 69 Given this view, the holding of Weichel! that composites 
are admissible as substantive evidence follows naturally from previous 
cases. The dissenters, on the other hand, distinguished between iden-
tification by composite and identification by other means, 70 arguing that 
courts should treat composite sketches differently because of the inherent 
potential for error in transcribing a witness's verbal description into an 
accurate picture and the potential for police suggestiveness. 71 As a result, 
the majority and the dissenters suggested different precautions to avoid 
these problems. The majority's approach allows the courts to limit the 
admission in evidence of unreliable or tainted composites. 72 In contrast, 
the dissenters would place the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate the 
reliability of the composite process. Absent that demonstration, the dis-
senters would establish a blanket rule disallowing composite sketches as 
either corroborative or substantive evidence. 73 
The accuracy of a composite in depicting the likeness of a suspect is 
necessarily dependent on a variety of factors, ranging from the length of 
time that the witness observed the defendant to the skill and objectivity of 
the police officer using the Identikit. While the dangers of allowing in 
evidence an inaccurate or dishonestly prepared composite are significant, 
a strict rule preventing their admission seems unnecessarily binding. 
Given the correct circumstances, a carefully prepared composite can be a 
valuable piece of evidence. With close monitoring and with careful appli-
cation by trial court judges, the Court's more flexible rule appears to be 
the sensible approach. 
In future cases where the admission of the composite is at issue, 
questions concerning the preparation of the sketch will certainly be criti-
cal. A defendant in opposing the admission of a composite should formu-
late arguments around the two areas specifically mentioned by the 
Weichel! Court: one, the extent of other identification evidence; 74 and 
two, the possibility that the pre-trial identification process was impermis-
69 See id. at 71-72, 453 N.E.2d at 1044. 
70 Id. at 87, 453 N.E.2d at 1053 (Liacos, J. dissenting); Blaney, 387 Mass. at 641, 442 
N.E.2d at 397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
71 390 Mass. at 87, 453 N .E.2d at 1053 (Liacos, J., dissenting); Blaney, 387 Mass. at 642, 
442 N.E.2d at 398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
72 390 Mass. at 72-73, 453 N.E.2d at 1045. 
73 Id. at 88, 453 N.E.2d at 1053 (Liacos, J., dissenting); Blaney, 387 Mass. at 643, 442 
N.E.2d at 398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While Justices Liacos and O'Connor authored 
separate dissents, their views appear similar. In fact, in Blaney, Justice Liacos stated in a 
concurring opinion that he agreed with the views set forth in Justice O'Connor's dissent. The 
two justices, however, disagreed over the issue of whether the composite had prejudiced the 
defendant. See 387 Mass. at 640, 442 N.E.2d at 397 (Liacos, J., concurring). 
74 For a case admitting a composite in evidence where the defendant was identified by 
only one witness, see People v. Fair, 45 Ill. App. 3d 301, 359 N.E.2d 848 (1977). 
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sibly suggestive. The success of these arguments will remain unclear until 
future cases more carefully define the standards governing admissibility 
under the Weichell rule. Regardless of the eventual standards chosen, 
Weichell will remain significant through its rendering of composites as 
important tools not only to police officers in the apprehension of suspects, 
but also to prosecutors in the conviction of defendants. 
§ 11.4. Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation.* Massachusetts statu-
tory law makes it a criminal offense to disseminate obscene material. 1 The 
courts are therefore often faced with the difficult issue of determining 
whether or not a particular item is obscene. While the statutory definition 
provides the trier of fact with some guidance, the definition is framed in 
general terms. 
Integral to a determination of whether material is statutorily obscene is 
an evaluation of both the artistic value of the material and the prevailing 
community standards. 2 The necessity of this evaluation has increased the 
acceptability of expert testimony. 3 The Supreme Judicial Court's position 
on the role of expert testimony in obscenity litigation has been two-fold. 
As to the Commonwealth's burden of proof, the Court has ruled that it 
need not introduce expert testimony to prove that material is obscene. 4 
Rather, the Commonwealth need only introduce the material itself to 
prove its obscenity under the statutory definition. 5 On the defendant's 
side, however, the Court has ruled that expert testimony is an important 
aspect of a defense and should only be excluded from testimony in rare 
cases. 6 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, deciding three 
cases on the same day, strengthened a defendant's ability to introduce 
expert testimony as part of a defense to the charge of disseminating 
obscene material, on both the material's artistic value and the prevailing 
community standards. 7 First, in Commonwealth v. United Books, Inc., 8 
* By Steven N. Berk, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ ll.4. I G.L. c. 272, § 29. 
2 See G.L. c. 272, § 3 which provides in pertinent part: "matter is obscene if taken as 
whole it (1) appeals to the prurient interest of the average person applying the contemporary 
standards of the county where the offense was committed; (2) depicts or describes sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way; and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value." 
3 See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 802, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1978). 
4 Id. at 799, 374 N.E.2d at 1219. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See Commonwealth v. United Books, Inc., 389 Mass. 888, 890, 453 N.E.2d 406, 412 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., Inc. (No. 1), 389 Mass. 902, 912, 452 
N.E.2d ll26, 1133 (1983); Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., Inc. (No.2), 389 
Mass. 917, 918, 452 N.E.2d ll35, ll36 (1983). 
• 389 Mass. 888, 453 N.E.2d 406 (1983). 
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the Court reversed a jury conviction in an obscenity case on the ground 
that the trial judge abused his discretion by disallowing the testimony of 
an expert witness, proffered by the defense, on the film's artistic value. 9 
Second, addressing the issue of an expert witness's role in assessing the 
prevailing community standards, the Court in Commonwealth v. Dane 
Entertainment Services, Inc. (No. 2)1°reversed a trialjudge's decision to 
exclude the testimony of a defendant's expert witness on relevant com-
munity standards.U Finally, although it did not focus on the issue of 
acceptable expert testimony, 12 the Court in Commonwealth v. Dane En-
tertainment Services, Inc. (No. 1) 13 reasserted its willingness to adopt a 
higher degree of scrutiny towards trial judge's decisions which disallow 
the introduction of expert witnesses to prove prevailing community stan-
dards.14 
In Commonwealth v. United Books, Inc. ,15 the Supreme Judicial Court 
reversed a jury verdict against a defendant who had been convicted for 
disseminating obscene material and fined $5,000 for violating chapter 272, 
section 29 of the General Laws. 16 On appeal, the defendant contended 
that the complaint should have been dismissed because the conviction 
was based on a statute that was unconstitutional under both the Massa-
chusetts and United States Constitutions. 17 The defendant also objected 
to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions issued by the trial judge. 18 The 
Court's decision to grant the defendant a new trial, however, was based 
solely on the judge's refusal to allow the defendant's expert to testify on 
the artistic value of the film. 19 
The record showed that the defendant attempted to call as an expert 
witness Professor Charles Blinderman to testify on contemporary com-
munity standards, and on the issue of the serious artistic, social, political, 
and scientific value of the allegedly obscene film. 20 On voir dire, Professor 
Blinderman testified that he was a professor of English at Clark Univer-
9 Id. at 896-97, 453 N.E.2d at 412-13. 
10 389 Mass. 917, 452 N.E.2d 1135 (1983). 
11 Id. at 918, 452 N.E.2d at 1136. 
12 389 Mass. 902, 912-13, 452 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (1983). 
13 389 Mass. 902, 452 N.E.2d 1126 (1983). 
14 Id. at 914 n.4, 452 N.E. 2d at 1134 n.4. 
15 389 Mass. 888, 453 N.E.2d 406 (1983). 
16 Id. at 889-90, 453 N.E.2d at 409. The conviction was based on the coin-operated film 
"Seak's Fullfillment [sic]" which was available for viewing at the defendant's store. 
17 ld. at 890, 453 N.E.2d at 409. The defendant claimed that G.L. c. 272, § 29 was 
unconstitutional under art. 1, 12 and 16 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution and the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 
18 389 Mass. at 898-901, 453 N.E.2d at 411-14. 
19 /d. at 890, 453 N.E.2d at 409. 
2o Id. at 894, 453 N.E.2d at 411. 
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sity in Worcester and had been a professor there for twenty years. 21 He 
explained that he taught a course in the university's evening division 
surveying erotic art over the centuries, which dealt in part with the nature 
of erotic expression in the Commonwealth. 22 Professor Blinderman fur-
ther testified that he was engaged in an investigation into erotic art in the 
Worcester area, 23 and that, as a result of his professional experience and 
research, he believed himself able to testify on the contemporary trends 
and attitudes in Massachusetts towards the depiction of sexual conduct. 24 
The trial judge ruled that Professor Blinderman was not qualified as an 
expert as to either contemporary community standards or the artistic 
value of the film. 25 In reversing the trial judge's decision the Court stated 
that it could find no acceptable reason why Professor Blinderman was not 
qualified as an expert on the artistic value of the film. 26 
The Court's analysis of the trial judge's decision to disallow the expert 
testimony of Professor Blinderman focused on two factors: first, the 
importance of expert testimony in obscenity litigation, and second, the 
degree of discretion afforded to trial judges in determining whether to 
accept the qualifications of an expert witness. 27 Addressing the impor-
tance of expert testimony in obscenity litigation, the Court noted that in 
the past both the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court had recognized the relevance and importance of 
experts in defending a charge that material is obscene. 28 The Court gave 
particular emphasis to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Smith 
v. California, 29 in which he had stated that expert testimony was the 
essence of a defense against obscenity and thus its exclusion may infringe 
21 Id. at 896, 453 N.E.2d at 412. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 Id. at 896-97, 453 N.E.2d at 413. 
25 /d. at 894, 453 N.E.2d at 411. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that while Professor 
Blinderman was proffered to testify on both community standards and artistic value, the 
focus of discussion at the trial was on Professor Blinderman's qualifications to testify as to 
relevant contemporary community standards. 
26 /d. at 896, 453 N.E.2d at 412. Before analyzing the judge's refusal of Professor 
Blinderman as an expert, the Court quickly dismissed the Commonwealth's contention that 
the defendant was foreclosed from appealing because it failed to make an offer of proof at 
trial. The Court ruled that such an offer was not necessary. See Newton Girl Scout Council, 
Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass. 189, 199, 138 N.E.2d 769, 776 (1956), 
and cases cited therein. 
27 389 Mass. at 895-96, 453 N.E.2d at 412. 
28 Id. at 895, 453 N.E.2d at 412 (citing Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. ll5, 121 (1973) 
(defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony); Commonwealth v. 
Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 802, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1978)). 
29 /d. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring)). 
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on the constitutional safeguards of due process. 30 The Court in United 
Books further noted that the necessity for expert testimony was 
heightened in Massachusetts where the Commonwealth carried its burden 
of proof by simply introducing the material itself into evidence. 31 Citing its 
earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Trainor, 32 the Court stated that only 
in rare cases should expert testimony be excluded on the grounds that it 
would not be helpful to the trier of fact. 33 The Court concluded the 
discussion by noting that expert testimony can serve the purpose of 
judicial efficiency by acting as a substitute for voluminous testimony. 34 
The Court then turned to the issue of the trial judge's degree of latitude 
in determining whether to accept a witness as an expert. 35 According to 
the Court, the standard for qualifying a witness as an expert is whether the 
witness possesses sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in the field of 
his testimony that the jury may receive appreciable assistance from it. 36 
While acknowledging that a trial judge's decision will be reversed only for 
abuse of discretion or error as a matter of law, the Court stated that a trial 
judge's discretion, while broad, is not without limits. 37 Because constitu-
tional concerns of free speech are involved in obscenity litigation, the 
Court stated, a closer scrutiny of a judge's decision to exclude expert 
testimony is warranted. 38 Against this background of law, the Court listed 
Professor Blinderman' s qualifications and noted that the trial judge had 
not questioned them. 39 The Court therefore concluded that under the 
circumstances of the case at bar, the trial judge erred in refusing to allow 
Professor Blinderman's testimony as an expert witness on the subject of 
the artistic value of the film. 40 
Expert testimony in obscenity litigation is used not only to determine 
30 Id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring)). 
31 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 802, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 
(1978)). 
32 374 Mass. 796, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (1978). 
33 389 Mass. at 895, 453 N.E.2d at 412. 
34 Id. at 895 n.4, 453 N.E.2d at 412 n.4. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 
(1974); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 172 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
35 389 Mass. at 895-%, 453 N.E.2d at 412. 
36 Id. at 896, 453 N.E.2d at 412 (citing Commonwealth v . .Boyd, 367 Mass. 169, 182, 326 
N.E.2d 320, 329 (1975)). 
37 Id. (citing ·Edinburg v. Merry, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 775, 777, 420 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (1981)). 
38 /d. See Hewett v. State Bureau of Censors, 243 Md. 574, 582, 221 A.2d 894, 900 (1966). 
39 389 Mass. at 895, 453 N.E.2d at 412. 
40 Id. at 897,453 N.E.2d at 412. Because of the Court's ruling on Professor Blinderman's 
status as an expert in the area of the material's artistic value, it was unnecessary for the 
Court to reach the issue of whether Professor Blinderman was a qualified witness as to 
community standards. In dicta, however, the Court noted that Professor Blinderman was 
also qualified to testify as to community standards. 389 Mass. at 897, 453 N.E.2d at 413. 
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whether allegedly obscene material contains any artistic value, but also to 
establish the relevant community standards. In Commonwealth v. Dane 
Entertainment Services, Inc. (No. 2), 41 the Supreme Judicial Court con-
sidered the correctness of a trial judge's decision to exclude the testimony 
of an expert on relevant community standards. 42 In Dane (No. 2) the 
defendant was convicted by a jury of possessing an obscene film, ''Orien-
tal Blue," with intent to disseminate it, and fined $5,000. 43 The defendant 
made several objections to the ruling, but the Court reversed on the 
grounds that the trial judge erred in disallowing the defendant's expert 
testimony on community standards. 44 The trial judge had ruled that the 
expert, again Professor Blinderman, was qualified to testify as to literary 
and artistic value, but not as to community standards. 45 In reaching its 
decision the Court referred to the stricter scrutiny standard adopted in 
United Books 46 for evaluating a trial judge's decision to exclude expert 
testimony in obscenity litigation. 47 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. 
Dane Entertainment Services, Inc. (No. 1) 48 did not tum on the issue, the 
Court in that case reasserted its willingness, expressed in United Books, 
to apply a high degree of scrutiny to a trial judge's decision to exclude 
expert testimony on the prevailing community standards. 49 The defendant 
in Dane (No. 1) was convicted of possessing obscene film material with 
the intent to disseminate it, in violation of chapter 272, section 29. 50 On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the judge erred in not granting its 
motion to suppress the film, to dismiss the complaint, and for relief from a 
pre-trial joinder. 51 In addition, the defendant objected to several of the 
judge's evidentiary rulings. 52 The Supreme Judicial Court focused on the 
trial judge's exclusion of the testimony of Donald Wilcox, an investigator 
whose findings were offered to show community standards concerning the 
issues of private interest and patently offensive conduct. 53 
The offer of proof made by the defendant at trial stated that Donald 
Wilcox, during the course of his investigation, viewed several movies 
4
' 389 Mass. 917, 452 N.E.2d 1135 (1983). 
42 Id. at 918, 452 N.E.2d at 1136. 
43 ld. at 917, 452 N.E.2d at 1136. 
44 Id. at 918, 452 N.E.2d at 1136. 
45 Id. 
46 389 Mass. 888, 453 N.E.2d 406 (1983). See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text. 
47 Dane (No. 2), 389 Mass. at 918, 452 N.E.2d at 1136. 
48 389 Mass. 902, 452 N.E.2d 1126 (1983). 
49 Id. at 914 n.4, 452 N.E.2d at 1134 n.4. 
50 Id. at 904, 452 N.E.2d at 1128. 
51 ld. 
•• Id. 
53 Id. at 910, 452 N.E.2d at 1131-32. 
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comparable to the ones in the case and counted the patrons who attended 
the screening of these films. 54 Mr. Wilcox also visited bookstores which 
openly displayed "x-rated" and adult video cassettes for sale or rental. 55 
The defense contended that the purpose of Mr. Wilcox's testimony was to 
show that the films involved in the current litigation were comparable to 
sexually explicit materials which are available to the community and 
viewed by a significant number of patrons. 56 
The Court began its analysis of the trial judge's decision to disallow Mr. 
Wilcox's testimony by noting that the evidence was not expert testimony, 
but rather comparison evidence, which sought to prove that the commu-
nity accepts the portrayal of the sexual conduct being challenged. 57 Ac-
cording to the Court, comparison evidence must satisfy a two-part found-
ational test to be admissible. 58 First, the comparison evidence must be 
similar to the material that is the subject of the litigation; and second, the 
compared material must enjoy a reasonable degree of community accep-
tance. 59 The trial judge, the Court stated, retained wide discretion in 
deciding whether the two-part foundational test has been met, particularly 
since the admission of evidence may make the trial unmanageably com-
plex and lengthy. 60 
The Court therefore upheld the trial judge's decision in Dane (No.1) to 
exclude the comparison evidence. In doing so, the Court distinguished 
between the comparative nature of the evidence offered by Mr. Wilcox 
and the expert testimony offered by Professor Blinderman in United 
Books and Dane (No. 2). 61 The Court did not belittle the importance of 
Mr. Wilcox's proffered evidence. 62 Such evidence, according to the 
Court, is relevant to show either that a film appeals to the prurient interest 
of the community or is patently offensive. The Court noted, however, that 
Mr. Wilcox had not seen the allegedly obscene film. 63 Further, the Court 
noted that a trial judge must be allowed to retain a large degree of 
discretion because the introduction of comparison evidence may increase 
the length and complexity of a trial. 64 The Court thus determined that the 
trial judge's decision to disallow Wilcox's evidence did not merit the 
54 /d. at 910-11, 452 N .E.2d at 1132. 
55 Id. at 911, 452 N.E.2d at 1132. 
56 Id. at 910, 452 N.E.2d at 1132. 
57 Id. at 912, 452 N.E.2d at 1133. 
58 Id. 
59 ld. 
60 Id. at 913, 452 N.E.2d at 1133. 
61 Id. at 912, 452 N.E.2d at 1133. 
62 ld. 
63 Id. at 912 n.3, 452 N.E.2d at 1133 n.3. 
64 Id. at 913, 452 N.E.2d at 1133. 
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closer scrutiny given to a trial judge's decision to exclude evidence of an 
expert. 65 
These three decisions do not alter the Court's prior posture on the need 
for expert testimony in obscenity litigation. 66 The Court has merely clar-
ified its willingness to protect a defendant's ability to call an expert in 
defense of an obscenity charge. The Court accomplished this goal by 
repeatedly stating that it will impose a higher degree of scrutiny on a trial 
judge's decision to deny a defendant's attempt to introduce expert tes-
timony. 67 The decision to diminish the discretion of the trial judge seems 
to be based in part on notions of due process and to a lesser extent on 
concerns of judicial efficiency. 68 The Court seems to fear that the denial of 
an expert witness will grant the Commonwealth an unfair advantage 
because its burden of proof is met by merely introducing the evidence 
itself. 69 
While the Court was clear in its willingness to favor expert testimony, it 
was less clear in articulating a standard by which an expert's qualifica-
tions will be judged. The Court merely stated that an expert's qualifica-
tions to testify on community standards should be based on relevant 
training, experience, research, study, and investigation. The Court has 
thus left the issue of what qualifications will constitute an expert in 
obscenity litigation to the trial judge. 
§ 11.5. Testimonial Privileges - Parent-Child Communications.* Tes-
timonial privileges are the exception to the rule that the public has the 
right to every person's testimony. 1 Such privileges exempt potential wit-
nesses from testifying in investigatory or judicial proceedings. 2 Generally, 
the number of testimonial privileges has remained fairly restricted, 
primarily because of the public's strong interest in obtaining all relevant 
evidence in judicial proceedings. 3 Among the testimonial privileges that 
have been granted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the 
Massachusetts Legislature are those relating to husband-wife, priest-
penitent, psychotherapist-patient, and attorney-client communications. 4 
65 Id. at 914 & n.4, 452 N.E.2d at ll34 & n.4. 
66 See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 802, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1978), 
67 See Dane (No. 1), 389 Mass. at 914 n.4, 452 N.E.2d at 1134 n.4. 
68 See United Books, 389 Mass. at 895, 453 N.E.2d at 412. 
69 ld. 
* By Cynthia R. Porter, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ ll.5. 1 Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359,455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 
(1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 104 S. Ct. 1421 (1984). See United 
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
2 Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (1983). 
3 See id. at 359-60, 455 N.E.2d at 1205. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 
(l%0) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
4 See id. at 360-61,455 N.E.2d at 1206. See also Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89,97 
32
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/14
§ 11.5 EVIDENCE 361 
In Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 5 the Supreme Judicial Court 
considered whether to recognize a testimonial privilege for parent-child 
communications. 6 Specifically, the Court considered the question 
whether an unemancipated minor could be compelled to appear and 
testify before a grand jury investigating the possible role of the child's 
father in the murder of a nonfamily member, despite objections from both 
the child and the parents to the child's testifying. 7 The· Court held that the 
child had no privilege to refuse either to appear or to testify. 8 
The plaintiffs in Three Juveniles were twelve, fourteen, and fifteen year 
old children who lived with their parents. 9 They were subpoenaed to 
testify before a grand jury on April 4, 1983 about their observations of 
their parent's activities on the evening of the murder and about any 
conversations they had heard between their father and the murder vic-
tim. 10 The children did not want to appear or to testify, nor did their 
parents want them to. 11 Consequently, on the scheduled date of their 
testimony, the plaintiffs moved to quash the subpoenas. 12 They based 
their motion on the grounds of a family or parent-child privilege. 13 A 
superior court judge denied the motion, but stayed the children's ordered 
appearance before the grand jury until April 14. 14 On April 13, the plain-
tiffs filed a petition for Suffolk County with the Supreme Judicial Court 
seeking a reversal of the denial of their motion to quash the subpoenas. 15 
A single justice of the Court allowed the parents to intervene, and also 
accepted an affidavit from the Commonwealth supporting its position that 
the children's expected testimony would be relevant to its investigation. 16 
The justice continued the stay of the children's appearance and, without 
decision, reserved the case for full Court determination. 17 
(1832) (attorney-client privilege); G.L. c. 233, § 20 (marital testimonial privileges); G.L. c. 
233, § 20A (clergyperson-member of congregation communications privilege); G.L. c. 233, § 
23B (psychotherapist-patient communications privilege). 
5 390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 
104 S. Ct. 1421 (1984). Justice Wilkins wrote the majority opinion, which Justices Liacos, 
Abrams, and Nolan joined. 
6 Id. at 357, 455 N.E.2d at 1204. 
7 ld. 
8 Id. The Court declined to consider the closely related question whether a child could 
refuse to testify as to confidential parent-child communications. Jd. 
9 Id. 
10 Jd. at 358, 455 N.E.2d at 1204. 
11 Jd. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 Id. 
17 ld. 
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On May 5, 1983, the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court heard the 
plaintiffs' arguments. 18 The Court reached conclusions on three separate 
questions. First, the Court affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs' motion to 
quash the subpoena. 19 Second, the Court held that the plaintiff children 
did not have the right, on either constitutional or other grounds, to refuse 
to appear and to testify at the grand jury hearing. 20 Third, the Court found 
that the plaintiffs' parents had no right, on either constitutional or other 
grounds, to prevent their children from appearing or testifying. 21 
The Court began its analysis of the plaintiffs' case with a general 
discussion of the policy behind testimonial privileges. 22 The Court first 
stressed that extending such a privilege contravenes the general rule that 
the public has a right to have every person's testimony. 23 In light of the 
existence of such a strong public interest, the Court stated that testimonial 
privileges should be "strictly construed," and such testimony excluded 
only when the public benefit arising from its exclusion overshadows the 
public's interest in obtaining the evidence subject to the privilege. 24 The 
Court concluded that, in order to determine whether the current boundary 
of testimonial privilege should be extended, it must weigh the need for the 
anticipated evidence against the interests which would be promoted 
through the exclusion of such evidence. 25 
Although noting that in recent years courts have tended to leave the 
creation of new evidentiary privileges to legislatures, the Court neverthe-
less found that it could judicially recognize the privilege of a child not to 
testify against his or her parent. 26 The Court went on, however, to distin-
guish this proposed parent-child privilege from existing judicially and 
legislatively created testimonial privileges. 27 According to the Court, the 
18 /d. 
19 /d. at 358-59, 455 N.E.2d at 1204-05. 
20 /d. at 359, 455 N.E.2d at 1205. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 359-60, 455 N.E.2d at 1205. For a complete discussion of the policy bases for 
granting a parent-child testimonial privilege, see Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: 
Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599 (1969); Stanton, Child-Parent 
Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. I 
(1982); but see Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 
45 ALB. L. REV. 142 (1980). 
23 390 Mass. at 359, 455 N.E.2d at 1205. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 
(1950). 
24 /d. at 359-60, 455 N.E.2d at 1205. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. l, 5, 438 N.E.2d 805, 
808 (1982). 
20 Id. at 360,455 N.E.2d at 1205. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,51 (1980);/n 
re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 609, 266 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1971). 
26 390 Mass. at 360, 455 N.E.2d at 1205-06. 
27 /d. at 360-61, 455 N.E.2d at 1206. The Court listed judicially recognized testimonial 
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majority of statutory and common-law privileges encompass only 
confidential communications between parties, and are not blanket disqual-
ifications from testifying such as that advocated by the plaintiffs. 28 The 
Court also noted that, while the Massachusetts Legislature has granted a 
testimonial privilege to certain confidential spousal communications, 29 
and has permitted one spouse to refuse to testify against the other spouse 
in most criminal proceedings, 30 the Legislature has not granted a parent-
child testimonial privilege or disqualification. 31 The Court expressly de-
clined to consider, as an issue not before the Court, the question whether 
there should be a limited testimonial privilege as to confidential parent-
child communications. 32 While noting that there is support in the case law 
of some jurisdictions for such a privilege, the Court stated that even 
jurisdictions recognizing the privilege have extended it only to include 
confidential communications made by the child to the parent, and not to 
those made by the parent to the child. 33 Ac<:ording to the Court, the 
majority of courts that have considered the issue of parent-child privilege 
have not recognized a blanket testimonial privilege for a child not to 
testify against his or her parents. 34 The Court found only one opinion that 
recognized such a privilege, and noted that the opinion had cited no 
authority or persuasive policy reason for its position. 35 
Finally, the Court considered whether either the constitutional right to 
privacy or society's interest in preserving family unity required the recog-
privileges as those of attorney-client and government informer. Id. Legislatively created 
privileges noted were those encompassing some communications made to clergypersons, 
psychotherapists, and social workers. I d.; see supra note 4. 
28 390 Mass. at 361, 455 N.E.2d at 1206. 
29 Id. See G.L. c. 233, § 20. 
30 390 Mass. at 361, 455 N.E.2d at 1206. This testimonial privilege is available except in 
criminal proceedings relating to child support or nonsupport. See G.L. c. 233, § 20, cl. 2. 
31 390 Mass. at 361, 455 N.E.2d at 1206. 
32 Id. at 361-62, 362 n.5, 455 N.E.2d at 1206 & n.5. 
33 I d. For cases upholding a parental privilege not to testify as to confidential communica-
tions made to them by their children, see In reA & M, 61 A.D.2d 426,433-34,403 N.Y.S.2d 
375, 380-81 (1978); Matter of Mark G., 65 A.D.2d 917,410 N.Y.S.2d 464,465 (1978) (mem.); 
People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312-13 (N.Y. County Ct. 1979). 
For cases refusing to recognize such a privilege, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served 
Upon Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 
748-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914-15 (1976); Cissna v. State, 170 Ind. App. 437, 439-40, 352 
N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976). 
34 390 Mass. at 362, 455 N.E.2d at 1207. 
a:s Id. at 363, 455 N.E.2d at 1207. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness: Agosto, 553 
F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983). For cases which did not recognize a blanket testimonial 
privilege as to general parent-child communications, see United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 
817, 818-19 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511, 512-13 (5th Cir. 
1981) (per curiam); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876,885 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Gilroy, 
313 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa 1981). 
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nition of a parent-child, nonconfidential communications testimonial priv-
ilege. 36 Balancing society's interest in obtaining the plaintiffs' testimony 
against the plaintiffs' interest in avoiding testifying against their father in a 
grand jury proceeding, the Court stated that it would not expand the 
number of existing testimonial privileges to include the right of children 
not to testify against their parents about nonconfidential matters. 37 
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court 
should have recognized a testimonial privilege in the case. 38 The dissent 
maintained that society's interest in obtaining the children's testimony 
was outweighed by the violence done to the child in obtaining such 
testimony, the concommitant damage to family unity, and the consequent 
injury to society which might result from compelling the children's tes-
timony. 39 In concluding that the Court should create a parent -child tes-
timonial privilege in this case, the dissent focused on the children's desire 
not to testify against their parents, the nature of normal parent-child 
relationships as weighing against such testimony, and the state's interest 
in fostering family integrity, as evidenced by its recognition of a spousal 
testimonial privilege in criminal cases. 40 
In the dissent's view, the precedent cited by the majority inadequately 
justified the Court's refusal to recognize a testimonial privilege in this 
case. 41 The dissent distinguished on two grounds the cases on which the 
Three Juveniles majority relied in reaching its decision. 42 First, the dissent 
asserted that in many of the cases relied on by the majority, courts had 
refused to recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege because of a 
reluctance to encroach on territory perceived as belonging to legisla-
tures. 43 The dissent observed, however, that no bar to judicially created 
new testimonial privileges exists in Massachusetts. 44 Second, the dissent 
found no reasoning in these cases that would compel the Supreme Judicial 
Court to deny recognition of a parent-child testimonial privilege. 45 Ac-
36 390 Mass. at 364, 455 N.E.2d at 1207-08. 
37 ld. 
38 /d. at 365, 455 N.E.2d at 1208 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote the 
dissenting opinion which Chief Justice Hennessey and Justice Lynch joined. 
39 ld. 
40 /d. at 366-67, 455 N.E.2d at 1209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
41 /d. at 368, 455 N.E.2d at 1209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
42 /d. 
43 /d. See, e.g., In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976); Hunter v. 
State, 172 Ind. App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977); Cissna v. State, 
170 Ind. App. 437, 352 N.E.2d 793 (1976); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981). 
44 390 Mass. at 368, 455 N.E.2d at 1209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
45 /d. at 368-69, 455 N.E.2d at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. 
Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Served Upon Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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cording to the dissent, these cases were distinguishable on their facts as 
either not involving testimony against a parent under investigation for a 
criminal act46 or as involving testimony about a parent who was not under 
investigation and which was sought from an emancipated adult not living 
with the parent. 47 
The dissent emphasized that a correct analysis of the questions raised in 
this case would primarily entail comparing the competing values raised. 48 
According to the dissent, the majority failed to cite any case in which a 
court had held on such analysis that the state's interests outweighed the 
other interests involved. 49 In support of its position, the dissent cited the 
case of In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness: Agosto, 50 where such an 
analysis of competing interests had been made, and where the court had 
held that a child had the right to. refuse to testify against his or her parent 
in a criminal proceeding on constitutional grounds. 51 Reasoning that the 
Agosto analysis supported the recognition of a parent-child testimonial 
privilege in the case at bar, the dissent in Three Juveniles concluded that 
unemancipated minors, living at home, should not be forced either to 
appear or to testify before a grand jury investigating their father's possible 
role in a murder. 52 
The Three Juveniles Court joins the clear majority of courts in refusing 
to create a parent-child testimonial privilege. In part, the Court's decision 
reflected an unwillingness to invade territory which might more properly 
belong to the legislature. 53 Such deference aside, the Court was in fact 
free to recognize a testimonial privilege in this case. 54 The majority 
refu~ed to do so on the ground that there is almost no support in other 
jurisdictions for creating a general parent-child testimonial privilege. 55 As 
the dissenting opinion emphasized, however, almost all of the cases relied 
on by the majority are distinguishable either factually, or on the ground 
46 390 Mass. at 368-69, 455 N.E.2d at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See United States 
v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980);/n re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Kinoy, 326 F. 
Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
47 See United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982). The dissent distinguished In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981), on the ground that it was unknown 
whether the child from whom the testimony was sought was a minor, emancipated, or living 
with her parents. 390 Mass. at 369, 455 N.E.2d at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
48 390 Mass. at 369, 455 N.E.2d at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
49Jd. 
"" See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness: Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983). 
51 390 Mass. at 369, 455 N.E.2d at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Agosto court 
recognized a parent-child testimonial privilege on the ground that the child had a constitu-
tionally based right to privacy. 553 F. Supp. at 1325. 
52 390 Mass. at 370, 455 N.E.2d at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
03 See id. at 360 & n.3, 455 N.E.2d at 1205 & n.3. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 362-63, 455 N.E.2d at 1207. 
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that the courts in those cases were required to leave the creation of new 
evidentiary privileges to the states' legislatures. 56 
In its analysis of the issues presented by this case, the majority dis-
missed too summarily the possible effects that testifying against their 
father might have on the plaintiffs. By focusing as it did on the lack of 
support in other jurisdictions for creating such a testimonial privilege, and 
by declining to invade what was perceived as the legislature's province by 
judicially creating a new evidentiary privilege, the Court unduly narrowed 
the proper scope of its inquiry in this case. The Court would have done 
well to follow more closely the reasoning set forth by the minority and 
thereby to inquire carefully into the effects its ruling might have on the 
children involved. Because one extremely important policy of the Com-
monwealth is to strengthen and encourage family life, 57 the Court had a 
duty to explore fully the adverse effects on both the child and the family 
which might follow from compelling children to testify against their parent 
in grand jury proceedings investigating that parent's possible role in a 
murder. By failing to adequately focus on possible effects of its decision 
on the children involved in this case, the Court granted the plaintiffs an 
impermissibly abbreviated consideration of their claims. 
There will be little confusion in this area of law after Three Juveniles, 
because the Court quite clearly ruled that there is no parent-child testimo-
nial privilege in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The Court did 
leave open, however, the question whether it might recognize a privilege 
encompassing confidential parent-child communications at some point in 
the future. 58 Although the Court declined to rule on this issue because the 
case at bar did not involve confidential communications, it noted that 
there is support in the case law for creating such a privilege. 59 The Court's 
opinion indicates that in future cases concerning this particular question, 
it might exercise its power to create new testimonial privileges and recog-
nize a child's right to refuse to testify about confidential communications 
by a child to a parent. 
§ 11.6. Paternity Suits - Offers to Pay for Abortion - Display of Child 
to Jury.* During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 1 the 
56 See id. at 368-69, 455 N.E.2d at 1209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
07 See, e.g., G.L. c. 119, § 1. 
118 See 390 Mass. at 362, 364, 455 N.E.2d at 1204, 1207. The Court stated that "[c]onfiden-
tial communications aside, we see no basis for concluding that a constitutional right of 
privacy requires that the children and their parents be given a testimonial privilege." Id. at 
364, 455 N.E.2d at 1207. 
59 I d. at 361, 362 n.4, 455 N.E.2d at 1206 & n.4. See supra note 33 for cases recognizing a 
testimonial privilege regarding confidential parent-child communications. 
* By Cynthia R. Porter, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 11.6. 1 389 Mass. 308, 450 N.E.2d 167 (1983). 
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Supreme Judicial Court changed Massachusetts law on evidence with 
regard to paternity suits in two principal respects. First, the Kennedy 
Court addressed the question whether an offer to pay for an abortion 
should be admitted against a defendant in a paternity action as evidence 
supporting the paternity claim, or whether such ari offer should be ex-
cluded as an offer of compromise. In Kennedy, a case of first impression, 
the Supreme Judicial Court joined the majority of jurisdictions in permit-
ting testimony on the putative father's offer to pay for an abortion. 2 In 
allowing such testimony, the Kennedy Court rejected the defendant's 
argument that the testimony merely constituted evidence of an offer to 
compromise, and concluded that an offer to pay for an abortion provides 
some evidence of paternity. 3 
Second, the Kennedy Court considered whether the plaintiff in a pater-
nity action may display the child's appearance to the jury as evidence of 
paternity. In Kennedy, the Court followed Massachusetts case law prece-
dent in permitting the child in question to be shown to the jury. 4 The Court 
held that in future paternity cases, however, a child's appearance may be 
shown to the jury only with accompanying expert testimony on the 
probability that certain of the child's physical characteristics were inher-
ited from the putative father. 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Kennedy 
Court reasoned that without accompanying expert testimony, it is often 
extremely difficult for jurors to identify which of the child's features may 
have been inherited from a defendant, and to avoid having their sym-
pathies impermissibly engaged when viewing the child. 6 
In Kennedy, the child's mother had sought in district court a paternity 
adjudication against the defendant 7 and a judgment that he had failed to 
contribute reasonably to his child's support. 8 The jury found the defen-
dant guilty of nonsupport, and the trial judge ordered child support pay-
ments of $125 per week along with payment of the child's medical and 
dental expenses. 9 The defendant appealed both his nonsupport conviction 
and the child support order to the Supreme Judicial Court, claiming that 
the trial judge wrongly admitted certain evidence. 10 The defendant based 
2 I d. at 313, 450 N.E.2d at 171. See infra note 19 for cases in which evidence of a putative 
father's offer to pay for an abortion was allowed at trial. 
3 389 Mass. at 309-13, 450 N.E.2d at 169-71. 
4 ld. at 313, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
5 ld. at 314, 450 N.E.2d at 172. 
6 ld. at 313-14, 450 N.E.2d at 172. 
7 ld. G.L. c. 273, § 12 controls proceedings of this type, which are civil in nature. 
Commonwealth v. Lobo, 385 Mass. 436, 447, 432 N.E.2d 4%, 502 (1982). 
8 389 Mass. at 308-09, 450 N.E.2d at 172. See G.L. c. 273, § 15. Under this statute 
nonsupport proceedings are criminal in nature. Commonwealth v. Chase, 385 Mass. 461, 
463-64, 432 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1982). 
9 389 Mass. at 309, 450 N.E.2d at 169. 
10 ld. at 309-13, 450 N.E.2d at 169-71. 
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his appeal on the grounds that the trial judge erred in permitting the 
complainant to testify that the defendant had offered to pay for an abor-
tion and in allowing the jury to view the seventeen month old child. 11 The 
defendant also argued that the support order was unfairly excessive. 12 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court first considered whether certain 
of the defendant's statements were erroneously admitted as evidence of 
paternity. 13 At trial, the mother was allowed to testify, over defendant's 
objection that after telling the defendant she was pregnant, they discussed 
the possibility of her obtaining an abortion. 14 The mother testified that, 
during this conversation, the defendant had suggested she obtain an 
abortion and had offered to pay for the operation, an offer which was later 
repeated. 15 The trial court also admitted in evidence the defendant's 
statement that he would make payments to the welfare department if 
necessary. 16 The defendant denied that he had made the offer to pay for an 
abortion, and, in the alternative, argued that evidence of an offer to pay 
for an abortion constituted evidence of an offer to compromise, and as 
such, should not have been admitted at trial. 17 
The Court, in its analysis of the defendant's arguments, noted that an 
offer to pay for an abortion is at least somewhat probative on the question 
of whether the offeror thought he was the father of the unborn child. 18 The 
Court further noted that a majority of jurisdictions have allowed evidence 
11 Id. at 309-15, 450 N.E.2d at 169-72. The defendant also argued that the trial judge erred 
in limiting evidence on the mother's prior inconsistent statements to the issue of her 
credibility. I d. 
12 Id. at 309, 315, 450 N.E.2d at 169, 172. 
13 Id. at 309-13, 450 N.E.2d at 169-71. 
14 I d. At trial, both the mother and the defendant admitted to having intercourse several 
times between June and late September, 1979. Id. at 309, 450 N.E.2d at 169. The child in 
question was born on June 1, 1980. I d. The mother had testified that the defendant was the 
only man with whom she had had sexual intercourse during that time. Id. At trial, the 
defendant had testified that the complainant had told him she was sterile. ld. The defendant 
also testified that he had used a condom each time he and the mother had had intercourse, 
although he knew that condoms are not a failsafe method of contraception. Id. 
15 Id. at 310, 450 N.E.2d at 169-70. 
16 Id. at 313, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
17 ld. at 310, 450 N.E.2d at 169-70. In considering this claim, the Court reviewed those 
rules of evidence which apply when a trial court determines whether to admit evidence that 
may tend to show paternity. Id. The Court first noted that a statement is considered relevant 
if it tends to make the desired factual inference either more or less probable than it would 
have been without that evidence. Id. See Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 210, 372 
N.E.2d 212, 218 (1978); Proposed MASS. R. Evm. 401. The Court also observed that if an 
objection is made to the admission of evidence, the trial judge makes a determination 
whether a reasonable jury could find that the evidence constituted an admission. 389 Mass. 
at 310, 450 N.E.2d at 169-70. See Proposed MAss. R. Evm. 104(a). 
18 389 Mass. at 310, 450 N.E.2d at 169-70. See Phillips v. Hoyle, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 568, 
571 (1855) (admission of testimony upheld where defendant had inquired of witness whether 
woman could be found to nurse child in question if defendant could settle the matter). 
40
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/14
§ 11.6 EVIDENCE 369 
that a putative father had offered to finance or arrange for an abortion in 
paternity suits. 19 The Court concluded that, apart from the issue of the 
probative value of the offer to pay for an abortion, in Kennedy there 
existed a jury question regarding whether the defendant's statements 
were made out of friendship, as the defendant claimed, or whether they 
constituted a partial admission of paternity. 20 
In considering the defendant's argument that his offer to finance an 
abortion was simply an offer to compromise, the Court noted that such a 
proposal is "in a sense" an offer to settle possible child support claims. 21 
The Court noted that a typical offer of compromise attempts to settle a 
claim arising from an event which has already occurred. 22 In distinguish-
ing the defendant's offer, the Court observed that in Kennedy the event 
giving rise to possible future nonsupport claims had not occurred when 
the offer was made, since the child had not yet been born. 23 The Court 
acknowledged, however, that had the defendant's offer been accepted 
and acted upon, the controversy would have been settled at that point. 24 
According to the Court, the difference between the defendant's offer and 
a typical compromise offer required further examination of the rationale 
for either admitting or excluding evidence of an offer. 25 
The Court, therefore, next considered the question whether evidence of 
the defendant's offer to pay for an abortion should be excluded on public 
policy grounds. 26 Initially, the Court noted that offers of compromise are 
19 389 Mass. at 310-11,450 N.E.2d at 170. See, e.g., Swindle v. State, 21 Ala. App. 462, 
463, 109 So. 369, 370 (1926); Gatzemeyer v. Peterson, 68 Neb. 832, 835 (1903); State ex rei. 
Fitch v. Powers, 75 S.D. 209,212, 62N.W.2d 764, 765-66(1%4). Additionally, the Kennedy 
Court noted that some courts have admitted evidence of the putative father's interest in the 
woman obtaining an abortion, even though there was never an offer made to pay for the 
operation. See, e.g., T.A.L.S. v. R.D.B., 539 S.W.2d 737,739 (Mo. App. 1976); People v. 
Mendel, 10 A.D.2d 767, 767, 197 N.Y.S.2d 484, 484-85 (1960). 
Although the Court noted that all of the cases cited above were decided before Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court concluded that the reasoning in those cases did not 
turn on the fact that abortion was illegal when they were decided. 389 Mass. at 311, 450 
N.E.2d at 170. 
20 389 Mass. at 310, 450 N.E.2d at 170. In drawing this conclusion, the Court explicitly 
stated that public policy might dictate whether such an offer should be excluded. Id. 
21 Jd. at 311, 450 N.E.2d at 170. 
22 Id. See Proposed MAss. R. Evm. 409. 
23 389 Mass. at 311, 450 N.E.2d at 170. The Court also noted that causing the complainant 
to become pregnant did not in itself give rise to a cause of action. ld. 
24 I d. The Court noted that even if the complainant had accepted the defendant's offer to 
pay for an abortion, she would have had to take the further step of obtaining the abortion in 
order for any future nonsupport claims to be settled. /d. The Court reasoned that this further 
distinguished the defendant's offer from a typical offer of compromise, because acceptance 
of a compromise offer usually extinguishes the claim without further action being necessary. 
/d. 
25 ld. 
26 Id. at 312, 450 N.E.2d at 170. 
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often extended simply out of a desire to settle a conflict, and thus may not 
constitute admissions of wrongdoing. 27 The Court further noted that the 
law favors settling disputes out of court if possible. 28 The Court found, 
however, that the Commonwealth's interest in encouraging out of court 
settlement of typical disputes was significantly different from its interest 
in offers to pay for an abortion. 29 According to the Court, excluding 
evidence of an offer to finance an abortion would make fact-finding more 
difficult in disputes about paternity, where the only other evidence of 
paternity is the conflicting testimony of the complainant and the defen-
dant. 30 In addition, the Court considered the Commonwealth's interest in 
protecting potential life as a ground for excluding the defendant's offer to 
pay for an abortion. 31 The Court found that an offer to finance an abortion, 
unaccompanied by an offer to pay childbirth costs and child support, 
tends to influence a pregnant woman in making a decision whether to have 
an abortion or to carry the child to term. 32 While acknowledging that, in 
the absence of a compelling state interest, the law should take a neutral 
position on abortion, the Court stated that the Commonwealth should do 
whatever is constitutionally possible to "advance the State's interest in 
the protection of potential life." 33 Consequently, the Court concluded that 
there was no overriding public policy which required that evidence of an 
offer to finance an abortion be excluded. 34 
After establishing that an offer to pay for an abortion is admissible in 
evidence, the Court next considered the defendant's objection to the 
admission at trial of testimony concerning his statement that, if necessary, 
27 /d. SeeK. HUGHES, EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE, 19 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§ 532, 
at 749 (1961); C. McCoRMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 274, at 663 (2d 
ed. 1972); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW§ 1061, at 36 (Chadbourn 
rev. ed. 1972). The Court stated that it assumed, without deciding, that the parties could in 
fact have settled the matter. For cases supporting this assumption, see Harrison v. District 
of Columbia, 95 A.2d 332, 334 (D.C. 1953); Fowler v. State, Ill Ga. App. 856, 858, 143 
S.E.2d 553, 554 (1965); Commonwealth v. Terry, 275 Pa. Super. 184, 186-87, 418 A.2d 673, 
674-75 (1980). The Court left open the question whether an agreement compromising a child 
support claim could in fact serve to limit the father's legal duty to support his child. 389 
Mass. at 312 n.3, 450 N.E.2d at 170 n.3. 
28 389 Mass. at 312, 450 N.E.2d at 170. SeeK. HuGHES, supra note 27, § 532, at 749; C. 
McCoRMICK, supra note 27, § 274, at 663; J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 1061, at 36. 
29 389 Mass. at 312, 450 N.E.2d at 171. · 
30 Id. at 312, 450 N.E.2d at 170-71. 
31 Id. at 312-13, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 663, 417 N.E.2d 387, 406 
(1981) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 334, 446 N.E.2d 395, 
397 (1983) (woman could not be compelled to undergo simple surgery required to maintain 
her pregnancy). 
34 389 Mass. at 313, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
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he would make payments to welfare for the child's support. 35 The Court 
held that the trial court had correctly admitted this evidence. 36 In reaching 
this decision, the Court reasoned that the statement was neither an offer 
of compromise nor impermissibly prejudicial to the defendant. 37 
Turning to the next issue, the Court addressed the defendant's objec-
tion to displaying the seventeen month old child to the jury in order for it 
to compare the child's appearance to that of the defendant. 38 The trial 
judge, the Court noted, has the discretion in Massachusetts to decide 
whether to show a child to a jury for such a purpose. 39 The youth of the 
child, the Court observed, merely relates to how much weight the jury 
should give to this ev~dence. 40 Apf>lying the Massachusetts rule, the Court 
held that the trial judge in Kennedy had not abused his discretion by 
permitting the child to be shown to the jury. 41 
The Court noted, however, that the Massachusetts rule allowing a child 
of any age to be shown to a jury as evidence of paternity represents a 
position taken by a distinct minority of states. 42 A very young child, the 
Court stated, may not yet have developed "settled features," making a 
realistic assessment of the child's resemblance to the putative father 
unlikely. 43 Further, the Court observed that exhibiting a child to a jury 
might unfairly appeal to the jurors' sympathies and thus impermissibly 
prejudice the defendant. 44 The Court therefore concluded that in future 
cases a child's appearance should be displayed to a jury as evidence of 
paternity only with accompanying expert testimony on the probability 
that certain of the child's physical characteristics are inherited from the 
putative father. 45 
35 ld. 
36 ld. 
37 I d. Additionally, the Court noted that the defendant had been free to request a jury 
instruction that abortion was not at issue in the case, which he failed to do. ld. The Court 
added that the trial judge was not obligated to give the jury such an instruction on his own 
initiative. Id. 
38 ld. 
39 ld. 
40 Id. See Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, 379 (1891). 
41 389 Mass. at 313,450 N.E.2d at 170. The Court noted that the trial judge had warned the 
jury not to favor the child emotionally in reaching their verdict. I d. at 314 n.4, 450 N.E.2d at 
172 n.4. 
42 Id. at 313, 450 N.E.2d at 171 (citing Dorsey v. English, 283 Md. 522, 524-25, 390 A.2d 
ll33, ll35-36 (1978)). 
43 ld. 
44 Id. at 314, 450 N.E.2d at 172. 
45 Id. See People, Int. ofR.D.S., 183 Colo. 89, 94, 514P.2d 772, 775-76(1973); Almeida V. 
Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 5%-604,465 P.2d 564, 567-71 (1970). The Kennedy Court limited the 
scope of its decision on the issue of permitting a child to be shown to a jury by noting that 
there may be other occasions when it would be appropriate for a child to appear before a 
jury. For example, the Court observed that a child would still be able to testify before a jury 
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Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's order of$125 per week child 
support as well as payment ofthe child's medical and dental expenses. 46 
Although the Court stated that the record was insufficient to permit it to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the award, the Court nonetheless con-
cluded that the support order was not excessive on its face. 47 The Court 
based this conclusion on the ground that public policy requires that both 
parents of an illegitimate child should share in the support and mainte-
nance of their child. 48 The burden of supporting the child, the Court 
stated, should be divided between the parents according to their individ-
ual circumstances, with the same standard of obligation to support applied 
to each parent. 49 Although the Court found no evidence in the record of 
the relative financial positions of the parties, it noted that the defendant 
was a physician and the mother a worker in a hospital admissions depart-
ment. 50 The Court stated that it assumed that the mother had custody of 
the child and that she either had to care for the child herself or pay 
someone else for child care while she worked. 51 Consequently, the Court 
found that on the record before it the order for support was not exces-
sive. 52 
In conclusion, the Kennedy Court's decision significantly changes Mas-
sachusetts law in two principal respects. After an extensive discussion of 
rules of evidence and public policy, the Kennedy Court affirmed the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling permitting testimony on the defendant's offer to 
in a paternity action to her relationship with the alleged father. 398 Mass. at 314,450 N.E.2d 
at 172. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. James, 104 Misc. 2d 1052, 1054, 429 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980). 
The Court found that only one of the remainder of the defendant's objections to the trial 
judge's evidentiary rulings needed extended discussion, and concluded that the rest came 
within the trial judge's discretion. 389 Mass. at 314,450 N.E.2d at 172. The Court did not list 
those objections which it held properly within the trial judge's discretion. I d. In regard to the 
final objection, the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling which limited testimony on the 
complainant's prior inconsistent statements to the issue of her credibility. Id. The Court 
stated that, in actions for nonsupport - proceedings which are criminal in nature, see 
Commonwealth v. Chase, 385 Mass. 461, 463-64, 432 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1982); G.L. c. 273, § 
15 - the complainant is not a party to the proceeding and thus the substantive content of a 
complainant's prior extra-judicial statements is not admissible except on the issue of credi-
bility. 389 Mass. at 314, 450 N.E.2d at 172. See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 80 Mass. (14 
Gray) 394 (1860); People v. Carson, 87 Mich. App. 163, 169, 274 N.W.2d 3, 6 (1978); 4 J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 1076, at 154. Paternity actions under G.L. c. 273, § 12 are civil in 
nature. See Commonwealth v. Lobo, 385 Mass. 436, 447, 432 N.E.2d 496, 502 (1982). 
48 389 Mass. at 315, 450 N.E.2d at 172. 
'7 Id. 
48 Id. 
48 ld. See Commonwealth v. Lobo, 385 Mass. 436, 446, 432 N.E.2d 496, 502 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Mackenzie, 368 Mass. 613, 618, 334 N.E.2d 613, 615 (1975). 
50 389 Mass. at 315, 450 N.E.2d at 172. 
5t Id. 
52 Id. 
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pay for an abortion. 53 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that 
such an offer provides probative evidence of paternity, and rejected the 
defendant's argument that the testimony simply constituted evidence of 
an offer to compromise. 54 In allowing evidence to be introduced that a 
defendant in a paternity suit has offered to pay for an abortion, the 
Kennedy Court joined the majority of jurisdictions that have considered 
the question. 55 
The Kennedy Court's prospective holding restricting the display of a 
child's appearance to a jury as evidence of paternity also significantly 
changes Massachusetts law. For the purposes of the case at bar, the Court 
followed relevant Massachusetts case law precedent, which in a paternity 
proceeding, allows a child's appearance to be shown to jurors, who are 
then free to draw their own conclusions about the child's parentage. 56 The 
Kennedy Court thus upheld the trial court's ruling which permitted the 
defendant's seventeen month old illegitimate child to be shown to the jury 
for the purpose of comparing the child's appearance with that of the 
defendant. 57 The Kennedy Court concluded, however, that it is difficult 
for jurors both to identify intelligently certain of the child's features which 
might have been inherited from the putative father and to avoid having 
their sympathies impermissibly engaged through viewing the child. 58 Con-
sequently, the Court held that in future cases a child may be shown to the 
jury only with accompanying expert testimony on the probability that 
certain of the child's physical characteristics were inherited from the 
putative father. 59 
§ 11.7. Privilege - Prejudicial Effect of Refusal to Testify in Jury's 
Presence.* Witnesses at a trial frequently exercise their rights under the 
law of privilege to refuse to testify about certain matters. 1 Where a 
witness who has had personal contact with the defendant elects to exer-
cise this privilege in a criminal proceeding, the danger exists that a jury 
53 Id. at 313, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
54 Id. at 312-13, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
55 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
56 389 Mass. at 313,450 N.E.2d at 171. See Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, 379 (1891). 
57 389 Mass. at 315, 450 N.E.2d at 171. 
saId. at 313-14, 450 N.E.2d at 172. 
59 Id. See supra note 45 for cases which also take this position. 
* Edward F. Mahoney, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 11.7. 1 For a description of the law of privilege in Massachusetts, seeP. LIACos, 
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE, 173-216 (5th ed. 1981). Among the privileges 
available are husband-wife, attorney-client, physician-patient, priest-penitent, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Drinkwater-Lunn, Evidence, 1979 ANN. SuRv. oF 
MAss. LAW§ 4.12, at 138 (husband-wife and attorney-client privileges); Wallach, Evidence, 
1975 ANN. SuRv. oF MAss. LAw§ 14.6, at 375 (attorney-client privilege); Fenton,Evidence, 
1974 ANN. SuRv. oF MAss. LAw § 9.3, at 167 (clergyperson-penitent privilege). 
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will infer from the refusal to testify that the defendant is actually guilty, 
and that the witness's silence is merely an effort to cover up the defen-
dant's guilt. 2 To avoid this possible prejudice, Massachusetts cases typi-
cally suggest that a prosecutor must refrain from calling a witness to 
testify when he is aware of a witness's intention to assert a privilege and 
not testify. 3 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Kane, 4 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court clarified the extent to which the Court would 
impose this limitation on prosecutors. The Kane Court held that a pro-
secutor in a murder trial could ask a Roman Catholic priest the contents of 
a conversation between himself and the defendant, despite the priest's 
assertion on voir dire that he would refuse to answer. 5 In reaching this 
decision, the Court applied the same two-part test that it had applied in 
the past. 6 The Court first examined whether the prosecutor's behavior 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct, and then whether improper infer-
ences from that behavior added critical weight to the prosecutor's case. 7 
In Kane, the defendant was convicted of murdering a two year old boy. 8 
At the time of the incident, the defendant lived in an apartment with the 
victim, the victim's three year old brother and the boy's mother. 9 A 
substantial amount of evidence suggested that the defendant, who regu-
larly beat the victim, had inflicted the injuries which eventually led to the 
boy's death. 10 
2 See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 191 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting). 
3 See Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 460, 378 N.E.2d 648, 654 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Martin, 372 Mass. 412, 421 n.17, 362 N.E.2d 507, 512 n.17 (1977). If the 
witness is in a position to testify to other relevant matters which are not privileged, the 
prosecutor may call that witness. The prosecutor should not, however, ask questions 
regarding the privileged information. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
4 388 Mass. 128, 445 N.E.2d 598 (1983). 
5 Id. at 135, 445 N.E.2d at 602. 
6 See Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 323, 403 N.E.2d 363, 369 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. Martin, 372 Mass. 412, 414, 362 N.E.2d 507, 508 (1977). 
7 388 Mass. at 138, 445 N.E.2d at 604. The factors which constitute the two-pronged test 
were first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Namet v. United States, 373 
u.s. 179, 186-87 (1963). 
8 388 Mass. at 129, 445 N.E.2d at 599. The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
second degree. /d. At the end of all the evidence, the judge allowed the defendant's motion 
precluding the jury from finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. I d. at 129 
n.1, 445 N .E.2d at 599 n.l. 
9 Id. at 129, 445 N.E.2d at 599. 
10 Id. at 130-33, 445 N.E.2d at 599-601. The evidence suggested that during the evening in 
which the injuries were inflicted, the mother checked on her son prior to departing for the 
store. Id. at 131, 445 N.E.2d at 600. At that time, the defendant, who was lying on his bed, 
was alone in the house with the two boys. Id. When the mother returned twenty to thirty 
minutes later, the defendant was still lying on the bed and the child was seriously injured. I d. 
While the defendant maintained that the child had fallen, expert testimony suggested that the 
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At trial the prosecution called a Roman Catholic priest to testify. 11 The 
defendant requested a voir dire of the witness. 12 During voir dire, the 
priest stated that due to his role as a priest, he would not testify as to a 
private conversation he had had with the defendant shortly after the 
victim was taken to the hospital. 13 The priest persisted in his refusal to 
testify even after the defendant, the holder of the privilege, consented to 
the disclosure. 14 The judge concluded voir dire by ruling that the priest 
should take the stand to testify to other relevant matters, and informed the 
priest that by not testifying he would be in contempt of court. 15 The judge 
refused to grant the defendant's motion that the prosecutor not be allowed 
to question the priest about the private conversation. 16 During the subse-
quent testimony before the jury, the prosecutor inquired as to the conver-
sation.17 After the judge overruled the defendant's objection, the priest 
declined to answer on the basis of his obligation under Roman Catholic 
Canon law. 18 The ,iudge informed the jury that the defendant had waived 
his privilege. 19 In addition he instructed the jury not to draw any infer-
ences from the priest's refusal to testify. 2° Counsel for the defendant then 
injuries resulted from a severe blunt force, such as a fist, foot, wall or door. /d. at 133, 445 
N.E.2d at 601. 
11 /d. at 135, 445 N.E.2d at 602. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. As the holder of the privilege, the defendant had the right to prohibit the priest from 
testifying as to the contents of their conversation. See infra note 15. Once the defendant 
waived that right, however, the conversation was no longer "privileged," and the priest was 
obligated under law to testify. 
15 /d. Under G.L. c. 233, § 20A, the penitent holds the privilege. The statute states: 
A priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed minister of any church or an accredited 
Christian Science practitioner shall not, without the consent of the person making the 
confession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional 
character, in the course of a discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the 
religious body to which he belongs; nor shall a priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed 
minister of any church or an accredited Christian Science practitioner testify as to any 
communication made to him by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice 
given thereon in the course of his professional duties or in his professional character, 
without the consent of such person. 
G.L. c. 233, § 20A. According to the Court, the validity of the witness's refusal to testify was 
immaterial to the issue of whether the silence prejudiced the defendant. 388 Mass. at 138 n.4, 
445 N.E.2d at 603 n.4. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 452, 459 n.2, 378 
N.E.2d 648, 653 n.2 (1978). 
16 388 Mass. at 136, 445 N.E.2d at 602. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. The judge found the priest in contempt of court and levied a nominal fine against 
him. /d. at 137, 445 N.E.2d at 603. 
19 /d. at 136, 445 N.E.2d at 602. 
20 !d. The judge instructed the jury as follows: 
I would say then, ladies and gentlemen, that he has testified as to what he has testified 
47
Berk et al.: Chapter 11: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
376 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 11.7 
conducted cross-examination of the priest and direct examination of both 
the defendant and his former attorney21 in an attempt to establish that the 
conversation did not incriminate the defendant. 22 
The defendant was convicted and appealed the judge's ruling which 
allowed the questioning of the priest. 23 According to the defendant, by 
forcing the priest to refuse to testify in the presence of the jury, the 
judge's ruling had raised prejudicial inferences as to the content of the 
conversation. 24 
In deciding that the judge's decision did not constitute prejudicial error, 
the Supreme Judicial Court applied a two-pronged test. 25 The Court first 
analyzed whether the prosecutor had attempted deliberately to raise im-
proper inferences in questioning the witness, such that the attorney's 
behavior constituted "prosecutorial misconduct. " 26 Second, the Court 
considered the entirety of the evidence and analyzed whether those infer-
ences added "critical weight" to the prosecution's caseY 
As to the first prong of the test, the Court concluded that the prosecutor 
had not acted improperly. 28 It was unnecessary, according to the Court, 
for the prosecutor to refrain from questioning the priest and thus to accept 
the defendant's account of the conversation. 29 Given the judge's warning 
to up to this point concerning what he observed, what he said, and what the defendant 
said is before you for evidence. He has declined to testify to a private conversation he 
had with the defendant, Peter Kane, in the motor vehicle between the Sturdy Memo-
rial Hospital and Plainville. And therefore I would further direct you that the refusal 
of the Father to testify that you may draw no inference as to what that conversation 
was. You may draw no inference, favorably or unfavorably against the defendant, 
Peter Kane, because of the Father's refusal to testify. He has indicated that he has 
refused on religious grounds. Those are not legal grounds and I have directed him to 
testify and he has stated that he will not testify. Therefore I would ask you to not draw 
any inference as to what that conversation was or was not. It is not before you. It is 
not to be certainly inferred against the defendant because the Father has determined 
that he will not testify as to that conversation. You have heard his reasons and 
therefore the record may stand at that point. 
/d. at 136-37 n.3, 445 N.E.2d at 602-03 n.3 (quoting the trial transcript). 
21 After the defendant waived his attorney-client privilege, his former attomey recounted 
the defendant's version of the conversation. According to the former attorney, the defendant 
had merely expressed his disbelief to the priest as to the number of problems that "they" 
had recently had. /d. 
22 /d. at 136-31, 445 N.E.2d at 602-03. 
23 /d. at 129, 445 N.E.2d at 599. 
24 /d. at 138, 445 N.E.2d at 603. The defendant also claimed that the ruling prevented 
effective cross-examination of the witness on this issue. /d. 
25 /d. at 138, 445 N.E.2d at 603-04. 
26 /d. at 138, 445 N.E.2d at 604. "Prosecutorial misconduct" would have occurred, 
according to the Court, if the prosecutor "unfairly exploited the matter." /d. 
27 /d. 
28 /d. 
29 /d. 
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to the priest on voir dire, the Court stated, the prosecutor could rea-
sonably have assumed that the priest would change his mind at trial and 
testify as to the conversation. 30 The Court acknowledged, however, that 
the question of prosecutorial misconduct was a close one. 31 In addition, 
the Court also emphasized that the prosecutor had not attempted to build 
his case out of inferences arising from the priest's silence. The Court 
noted that the prosecutor had asked the priest only one question about the 
conversation and that he had not attempted to establish "facts" through 
the posing of leading questions. 32 The Court further emphasized that the 
prosecutor had not referred to the conversation in his closing argument. 33 
Turning to the second prong of the test, the Court determined that any 
improper inferences drawn from the priest's refusal to answer had not 
added "critical weight" to the prosecution's case. 34 The Court relied on 
several factors in reaching this decision. First~ the priest had testified that 
his decision to keep the conversation confidential was unrelated to the 
specifics of his exchange with the defendant, but was instead premised on 
his general duties to maintain confidences as a priest. 35 Second, the judge 
had issued immediate instructions to the jury, directing them not to draw 
any inferences from the priest's silence. 36 Third, both the defendant and 
his former attorney had testified as to the innocuous content of the 
discussion. 37 Finally, and most importantly, the prosecution had oth-
erwise established a strong case against the defendant. 38 The priest's 
silence, therefore, constituted only a very small part of the trial and was, 
in the Court's view, relatively unimportant. 39 
The Court thus held that the judge had not abused his discr!!tion by 
allowing the prosecutor to question the priest about the conversation, 
30 /d. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. 
33 Id. Other courts have found that detailed and persistent questioning of witnesses 
claiming a privilege has prejudiced their right to a fair trial. See Sanders v. United States, 373 
F.2d 735, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1967) (prosecutor asked fifty-five questions despite the witness's 
refusal to answer); Shockley v. State, 335 So. 2d 659, 662 (Ala. Crim. App.) (persistent 
questions seen as attempt to induce jury to draw improper inferences), aff' d, 335 So. 2d 663 
(Ala. 1976); Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 448, 451, 299 S. W.2d 706, 708-09 (1956) 
(through leading and fact-laden questions, prosecutor presented his theory of the crime). 
34 388 Mass. at 139, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
35 /d. 
36 /d. See supra note 20. 
37 388 Mass. at 139, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. For cases holding that the witness's refusal to testify did add "critical weight" to the 
prosecution's case, see United States v. Ritz, 548 F.2d 510, 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1977) (rest of 
prosecution's case relatively weak); Robinson v. ,Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1293-95 
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (inferences drawn added critical weight). 
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despite the priest's assertion on voir dire of his intent to remain silent. 40 In 
its reasoning, the Court clarified its position as to when a prosecutor 
should refrain from questioning such a witness. 41 The Court referred to its 
earlier statements in Commonwealth v. Martin. 42 In Martin, the Court had 
suggested that a prosecutor should not ask a witness a question in front of 
the jury if that witness had clearly stated in advance that he would not 
respond. 43 The Martin Court, however, had added that a prosecutor was 
not required to assume that a witness would refuse to answer questions in 
the presence of the jury. 44 Based on this limitation in Martin, and based on 
its view that the judge in the Kane trial was in a better position to observe 
the witness and gauge his potential for changing his mind about testifying, 
the Kane Court affirmed the trial judge's decision. 45 The Court qualified 
its holding, however, by reiterating that the judge had not abused his 
discretion. The Court emphasized that this standard of review did not 
permit it to speculate on whether as a trial court it would have reached the 
same conclusion. 46 Yet the Court suggested that the prosecutor and the 
judge might not have adequately considered the Court's position in Mar-
tin regarding a witness who had firmly stated on voir dire that he will 
refuse to answer a question. 47 Calling the matter "an unnecessary appel-
late issue," the Court stated that without the other "saving circum-
stances" enunciated in its opinion, it might have reversed the decision. 48 
The Kane Court's treatment of the priest's refusal to testify is consis-
tent with the approach taken in prior decisions. 49 The Court set forth a 
two-pronged test designed to measure the degree of prosecutorial mis-
conduct and the extent to which improper inferences added critical weight 
to the prosecution's case. The Court had considered these factors in 
earlier cases. 50 In applying this test in Kane, the Court did clarify its view 
as to when a prosecutor can question a witness despite that witness's 
announced intention to exercise a privilege. 
In Kane, the priest made it relatively clear on voir dire that he would 
not reveal the substance of the conversation. 51 According to the Court, 
40 388 Mass. at 139, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
41 /d. 
42 372 Mass. 412, 362 N.E.2d 507 (1977). 
43 /d. at 421 n.17, 362 N.E.2d at 512 n.17. 
44 /d. at 420, 362 N.E.2d at 512. 
45 388 Mass. at 139, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
46 /d. . 
47 /d. 
48Jd. 
49 Id. at 138, 445 N.E.2d at 603-04. For cases utilizing this approach, see supra note 6. 
50 See Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 323, 403 N.E.2d 363, 369 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451,458-62, 378 N.E.2d 648, 651-53 (1978); Commonwealth 
v. Martin, 372 Mass. 412, 414, 362 N.E.2d 507, 508 (1977). 
51 388 Mass. at 135, 445 N.E.2d at 602. 
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however, the prosecutor's insistence on questioning him about that con-
versation did not constitute reversible error because of a number of saving 
factors. 52 From the Court's discussion of the two-pronged test, it appears 
that these factors included findings that the prosecutor could have rea-
sonably believed that the priest would change his mind, that he ques-
tioned the witness only once, that he did not ask leading questions, and 
that he refrained from referring to the issue in his closing argument. 53 
Additionally, the judge had promptly instructed the jury not to draw 
inferences from the priest's silence, both the defendant and his former 
attorney had testified to the innocuous nature of the conversation, and a 
substantial amount of otl,ler evidence implicated the defendant. 54 All these 
factors served, in the Court's view, to limit the amount of prejudice to the 
defendant resulting from the prosecution's questioning of the priest. 
Given the Court's statement that these factors were necessary to save the 
conviction, Kane may be viewed as offering more definitive guidelines 
concerning this issue than were provided in Commonwealth v. Martin and 
other earlier cases. 55 The Court's general displeasure with the trial judge 
and the prosecutor may indicate that the particular facts in Kane repre-
sent the most that a prosecutor with advance knowledge of a witness's 
intention not to testify can do in questioning that witness without risking a 
reversal of the conviction. 
Despite the Court's thorough survey of the factors bearing on the issue 
of whether the questioning of the priest constituted reversible error, the 
Kane decision both leaves questions open and raises new questions. For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Martin 56 the Court stated in a footnote that 
it was not deciding whether prosecutorial misconduct alone constituted 
reversible error, or whether that misconduct must also have added critical 
weight to the prosecution's case. 57 Because the Kane Court neither found 
prosecutonal misconduct nor concluded that inferences from the priest's 
silence added critical weight, the Court once again failed to indicate the 
relative weight to be given each prong of the test. As a result, the question 
remains unresolved. 58 
•• Id. at 140, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
53 Jd. at 138, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
04 /d. at 139, 445 N.E.2d at 604. 
•• See supra note 50 . 
.. 372 Mass. 412, 362 N.E.2d 507 (1977). 
• 7 Jd. at 421 n.17, 362 N.E.2d at 512 n.17. 
oa In Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (l%3), the Supreme Court affirmed a convic-
tion even though the prosecutor forced the witness to claim a privilege in the presence of the 
jury. /d. at 190. In that decision, the Court noted that several of the lower courts had found 
that error under either prong of the test constituted grounds for reversal. ld. at 186. The 
Court, however, declined to rule on the correctness of those decisions. Id. at 187. Cf. 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737 (l%9). 
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Moreover, the Court never discussed the possible implications of the 
witness's status as a priest. All the precedents cited in Kane, and the vast 
majority of cases considering this issue, have involved a witness claiming 
the fifth amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. The danger in 
fifth amendment cases is that a jury will infer from the witness's silence 
that the defendant was associated with the witness in the same illegal 
activity and, consequently, that the defendant is most likely guilty. 59 
When, however, the witness is not exercising his fifth amendment rights 
and, moreover, is an ordained priest, a jury is unlikely to draw these same 
inferences. The risk of prejudice still remains because a jury might ques-
tion whether a discussion with a priest shortly after an alleged crime was 
actually some form of a confession. Differences exist, however, between 
a co-conspirator claiming that he cannot respond to questions about past 
events without implicating himself, and a priest insisting that due to his 
religious obligations he will not answer questions concerning private 
discussions. The question therefore arises whether the status of the wit-
ness and the source of his privilege affected the reasoning of the Court. 60 
Due to the Court's decision not to discuss these potential distinguishing 
factors in Kane, the possibility exists that a future case involving a 
prosecutor's questioning of a witness whom he knows will assert his fifth 
amendment rights will distinguish Kane as a case involving not only a 
different privilege, but also a more trustworthy witness. 61 
In sum, the Kane decision is sound both in terms of its application of 
the two-pronged test and in the Court's determination that prejudicial 
error did not occur. By voicing its displeasure with the prosecutor and the 
judge, the Court added further guidance to the question of when a pro-
secutor may ask a witness questions despite his knowledge of the wit-
ness's intention to exert a privilege not to testify. The Court, however, 
59 See Martin, 372 Mass. at 413-14, 362 N.E.2d at 508. 
60 The argument that differences exist between the priest's refusal to testify here and a 
witness's exercise of his fifth amendment rights is strengthened through an analysis of the 
precedent relied on by the Kane Court. In Martin, the Court noted that the potential 
prejudice consisted of • ·invidious inferences associating the witness with the defendant in an 
illegal enterprise." 372 Mass. at 413, 362 N.E.2d at 508. In a later case, Commonwealth v. 
Fazio, the Court distinguished Martin due to the status of the witness as a victim rather than 
a co-conspirator. 375 Mass. 451, 460 n.3, 378 N.E.2d 648, 654 n.3 (1978). The Fazio Court 
stated that, "the claim of the witness ... of the privilege against self-incrimination would be 
most unlikely to create an 'invidious inference' of association with the defendant in an illegal 
enterprise as might have been an issue in Martin." /d. It is surprising that the Court would 
distinguish Fazio, another fifth amendment privilege case, but not even mention the distinc-
tion in Kane. 
61 The general trustworthiness of a priest is significant because in Kane, the priest testified 
in front of the jury that his refusal to reveal the conversation was not "depend[ent] on the 
nature of the disclosures to him, whether incriminating or not." 388 Mass. at 139, 445 
N.E.2d at 604. 
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has left questions unanswered, particularly through its decision not to 
discuss potentially distinguishing factors between Kane and relevant pre-
cedents. 
§ 11.8. Attorney-Client Privilege- Availability of Selective Waiver for 
Non-Party Witnesses.* Massachusetts has long recognized the viability of 
the attorney-client privilege. 1 The privilege is the oldest judicially estab-
lished means of protecting confidential communications. 2 The privilege 
seeks to encourage open discussions between attorneys and clients3 by 
minimizing a client's apprehension about revealing sensitive matters. 4 
Historically, the privilege's scope was narrow and only applied to disclo-
sures that took place during judicial and administrative proceedings. 5 The 
privilege's present scope is far broader, extending to the protection of 
certain documents and statements made out of court. 6 
Generally, a disclosure of a protected communication waives the 
attorney-client privilege. 7 The basis for the waiver of the privilege is 
twofold. First, the privilege exists to protect confidentiality. 8 Once 
confidentiality has been destroyed, the rationale for the privilege no 
longer exists. 9 Second, a party's attempt to disclose one aspect of a 
confidential conversation while withholding the remainder of the discus-
sion may serve to mislead an opposing party. 10 
The common law recognizes circumstances where a client's waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege will be limited to the discrete subject matter 
of the disclosed communication.U In Massachusetts, however, the Su-
* Steven N. Berk, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ ll.8. 1 See Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89 (1831). 
2 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1982). 
3 I d., § 2306, at 590. 
4 I d., § 2290, at 543. 
5 Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an 
Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System and the Corporate 
Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495 495-96 ( 1982). 
6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2306-2310, at 590. 
7 C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 93 (2d ed. 1972). See also In 
re Horwitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). 
8 In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 
see J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 23ll, at 599. 
9 See Underwater Storage Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 
(D.C. 1970) (once confidentiality is breached, basis for continued existence of privilege is 
destroyed). 
10 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 636. See Handgolds Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (central consideration in assessing valid waiver is 
fairness). 
11 Id. See Wei! v. Investment Indicators, Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18 
(9th Cir. 1981); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
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preme Judicial Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether 
the scope of a witness's waiver of the attorney-client privilege can be 
confined to a discrete subject. The Supreme Judicial Court's decisions 
have been limited to the more basic issue of whether the attorney-client 
privilege is automatically waived when a witness chooses to testify. 12 
During the Survey year, a witness's ability to selectively waive the 
attorney-client privilege was considered by the Appeals Court. In the case 
of N eitlich v. Peterson 13 the court held that a non-party witness may 
selectively invoke the attorney-client privilege, and therefore only relin-
quish the privilege as to the discrete subject matter of the disclosed 
communicationY Neitlich v. Peterson involved an allegation of libel,15 
The plaintiff, Mr. Neitlich, was an attorney who alleged that he had been 
libelled by the defendant Wayne N. Peterson. 16 Mr. Peterson's actions 
included sending a letter to the Massachusetts Bar Association accusing 
Mr. N eitlich of violating the Canons of Ethics which regulates members of 
the Massachusetts bar Y Specifically, he alleged violations of Canon 4: 
"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client;" and 
Canon 5: ''A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment 
on behalf of a client." 18 Mr. Peterson's letter to the Massachusetts Bar 
Association was prompted by the plaintiff's decision to represent Mr. 
Peterson's wife in divorce proceedings, despite having previously rep-
resented both Mr. Peterson personally and a corporation he controlled on 
business matters. 19 
Affirming a jury verdict in the superior court, the Appeals Court held 
that the defendant's decision to send a letter to the Massachusetts Bar 
Association did not constitute libel. 20 The Appeals Court's analysis fo-
cused on the narrow issue of whether the trial judge's decision to allow 
Mrs. Peterson to selectively invoke the attorney-client privilege was 
correct. 21 Mr. Peterson called Mrs. Peterson to the witness stand and on 
direct examination asked her about conversations she had with Mr. Neit-
lich, the plaintiff, concerning tax returns for 1971, 1972 and 1973.22 Before 
answering the question, Mrs. Peterson asked the trial judge whether 
12 Compare Woburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193, 200 (1869); Montgomery v. Pickering, 
ll6 Mass. 227, 231 (1874). 
13 15 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 447 N.E.2d 671 (1983). 
14 Id. at 627, 447 N.E.2d at 674. 
10 ld. 
16 Id. at 623, 447 N.E.2d at 672. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Jd. at 624, 447 N.E.2d at 672. 
21 Id. at 625-28, 447 N.E.2d at 673-74. 
22 Id. at 625, 447 N.E.2d at 673. 
54
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/14
§ 11.8 EVIDENCE 383 
answering the question would waive the attorney-client privilege as to all 
conversations with Mr. Neitlich or merely the subject matter of the 
instant question. 23 The trial judge responded by explaining to Mrs. Peter-
son that her answer to the question would only waive the attorney-client 
privilege as to the particular subject matter of the question. 24 
The plaintiff appealed the trial judge's decision to allow Mrs. Peterson 
to selectively waive the attorney-client privilege. 25 The Appeals Court, 
affirming the decision, initially noted that prior decisions by the Supreme 
Judicial Court were divided on the more basic issue of whether a witness 
waives the attorney-client privilege entirely by simply taking the witness 
stand. 26 The court noted that case law on that issue includes two parallel 
yet inconsistent lines of decisions. 27 The first line of cases, with its roots in 
Woburn v. Henshaw, 28 holds that once a witness takes the stand, he 
waives the attorney-client privilege and is open to complete cross-
examination on any communication that has taken place between himself 
and his attorney. 29 The second line of cases, beginning with Montgomery 
v. Pickering, 30 holds that the attorney-client privilege is not completely 
waived by a witness who chooses to testify. 31 The court concluded that 
the second line of cases was the "preferred path." 32 
In choosing to adopt the view of the second line of cases, the Appeals 
Court noted that Mrs. Peterson was not a party to the case being liti-
gated. 33 According to the court, this factor distinguished the Neitlich case 
from the line of Supreme Judicial Court cases which rejected a party 
witness's ability to take the witness stand and still retain the attorney-
client privilege. 34 It would be impermissible, the court noted, for a witness 
to waive the privilege for the purpose of introducing favorable testimony 
and then assert the privilege to halt cross-examination. 35 The court then 
found that Mrs. Peterson was prepared to be a cooperative witness on 
both direct and cross-examination, and that her selected waiver of the 
23 ld. 
24 ld. 
25 Id. at 626, 447 N.E.2d at 673. 
26 Id. See supra note 12 and cases cited therein. 
27 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 626, 447 N.E. 2d at 673. See Spalding, The Uncertain State of the 
Law as to Waiver of Professional Privilege as to Confidential Communications, 20 MAss. 
L.Q. No. 3, at 16, 19 (1935). 
28 101 Mass. 193, 200 (1869). 
29 Id. at 200. 
30 116 Mass. 227 (1874). 
31 ld. at 231. 
32 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 627, 447 N.E.2d at 674. 
33 Id. It simplifies the decision in the instant case that Dorothy was not a party to the 
action. 
34 ld. 
35 ld. 
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attorney-client privilege was not intended to further her own interests or 
that of either side in the litigation. 36 
The Appeals Court concluded its analysis by focusing on the scope and 
exact subject matter of Mrs. Peterson's waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege. According to the court, her waiver of the privilege was limited 
to conversations she had with the defendant, Mr. Neitlich, concerning the 
present libel suit and her prior divorce proceeding. 37 The court, however, 
concluded that she retained the privilege as to conversations regarding her 
own and her husband's financial affairs, and the details of their married 
life. 38 The court surmised that the subject areas in which Mrs. Peterson 
chose to waive the attorney-client privilege were distinct from the subject 
areas in which she attempted to assert the privilege. 39 Consequently, the 
court allowed Mrs. Peterson to maintain the confidentiality of the 
attorney-client privilege over certain subject areas. 40 
Although the Neitlich decision involved a non-party witness, the rea-
soning of the Appeals Court suggests that the holding can be extended to 
witnesses who are parties to the litigation as well. The court focused on 
two factors in determining whether to uphold a witness's limited waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege. 41 These factors were first, the witness's 
purpose for requesting a limited waiver of the privilege, and second, 
whether the waiver of the privilege can be limited to a discrete subject 
matter. 42 The identity of the witness should therefore not determine 
whether a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege is upheld. 
The Appeals Court's decision in Neitlich, upholding a witness's ability 
to limit his waiver of the attorney-client privilege, is consistent with the 
views of commentators on Massachusetts law43 and with judicial deci-
sions in other jurisdictions. 44 Massachusetts Proposed Rule of Evidence 
510 adopts a position similar to the one adhered to by the Appeals Court. 
The rule states that the attorney-client privilege is only waived if a witness 
voluntarily discloses a significant aspect of a particular privileged subject 
area. 45 
The proposed Massachusetts rule, therefore, implies that if a witness 
merely discloses a discrete portion of a confidential communication, the 
86 Id. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. 
43 P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 214-15 (5th ed. 1980). 
44 In re Grand Jury Subpeona Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1033-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 
Littlefield v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 477, 483-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371-72 (1982). 
•• See supra note 40. 
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attorney-client privilege will be retained as to any undisclosed communi-
cations. Although the Supreme Judicial Court has not directly upheld a 
witness's ability to limit his waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the 
current weight of authority suggests that if the court is faced with the 
issue, it will uphold the appellate court's ruling inNeitlich v. Peterson. 46 
The effect of the decision would be to sanction the limited waiver of the 
attorney-client privileges under circumstances where a witness discloses 
only a discrete portion of a protected communication and does not at-
tempt to unfairly advance one side of the litigation. 
46 See supra notes 40-41. 
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